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Abstract
We present a formal logic for quantitative reasoning about security
properties of network protocols. The system allows us to derive concrete
security bounds that can be used to choose key lengths and other security
parameters. We provide axioms for reasoning about digital signatures and
random nonces, with security properties based on the concrete security of
signature schemes and pseudorandom number generators (PRG). The for-
mal logic supports first-order reasoning and reasoning about protocol in-
variants, taking concrete security bounds into account. Proofs constructed
in our logic also provide conventional asymptotic security guarantees be-
cause of the way that concrete bounds accumulate in proofs. As an il-
lustrative example, we use the formal logic to prove an authentication
property with concrete bounds of a signature-based challenge-response
protocol.
1 Introduction
Large and complex cryptographic protocols form the backbone of internet se-
curity today. At the scale of the internet, protocols use keys to communicate
with millions of agents over extended periods of time, with increasingly powerful
adversaries attempting to break them. In this scenario, evaluating security in a
quantitative sense with respect to key lengths and adversary runtimes is critical.
Concrete security is a practice-oriented approach to cryptography that requires
that proofs of a security property be accompanied by a concrete probability
with which the property is false.
We present Quantitative Protocol Composition Logic (QPCL), a formal sys-
tem that supports concrete security proofs of probabilistic safety properties of
cryptographic protocols. A typical assertion in QPCL is a concrete security
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statement of the form B(ϕ), which we call a probabilistic belief. Here ϕ is a
temporal safety property of the execution of a protocol in the presence of proba-
bilistic polynomial time adversaries, and  is a probability that is a function of η,
the security parameter governing the length of keys and nonces, and t, the con-
crete runtime of the adversary. This assertion is true if ϕ holds with probability
at least 1 − (η, t). Typically,  also depends on functions that represent the
probability of an adversary violating the security of the specific cryptographic
primitives used in a protocol.
QPCL’s proof system provides a separation among axioms and rules for cryp-
tographic primitives, probabilistic beliefs, and programs. QPCL axioms about
cryptographic primitives such as signature schemes and pseudorandom-number
generators introduce a probabilistic error bound. These axioms have formal
soundness proofs that show that whenever an axiom is false on a trace, an attack
on the corresponding primitive can be constructed. Therefore, these probabilis-
tic error bounds are closely related to the security of the underlying primitive.
These soundness proofs are a central contribution of this paper. Axioms about
cryptographic primitives introduce concrete bounds that are combined in QPCL
using proof rules for reasoning about probabilistic beliefs, adapting an approach
introduced by Halpern [1], which in turn is based on the -semantics of Gold-
szmidt, Morris, and Pearl [2]. Traces generated by protocol programs serve as
an instance of the more general semantic models of Halpern, allowing us to
adapt the sound and complete proof system from [1] into our logic. Finally, in
the style of Protocol Composition Logic, QPCL’s predecessor for symbolic [3]
and asymptotic reasoning [4], QPCL includes a Hoare-style program modality,
and an operator for temporal ordering of actions that allows reasoning about
non-monotonic safety properties of program traces.
Reasoning about concrete bounds in QPCL necessitates some important dif-
ferences from its symbolic and asymptotic predecessors. Firstly, to achieve pre-
cise concrete bounds, the placement of quantifiers must be carefully considered.
For example, ∀x.B(ϕ) expresses a probabilistic bound on ϕ that applies to all
choices of x, whereas B(∀x.ϕ) bounds the probability of ∀x.ϕ; when x ranges
over a large domain, a more precise bound can be derived for the first formula.
Secondly, we restrict the proof system so that only safety properties are provable
in QPCL. This restriction allows us to follow a useful proof strategy, where we
first reason about the probability of a post-condition of a program being false,
and then transfer a bound on that probability to the end of the execution of
the protocol. For safety properties the probability of a formula being false at
some point in an execution is bounded by the probability of a formula being
false at the end of that execution. Section 5.4 discusses the importance of the
restriction to safety properties.
QPCL assertions are interpreted over traces generated by a simple proba-
bilistic, concurrent programming language executing in the presence of an ad-
versary. The semantics of the programming language is independent of any
particular cryptographic primitive, due to a separation between actions and
their implementations. Our formal treatment of this separation is simpler than
a full module system such as the one used in [5], and yet exposes the features
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(runtimes and trace probabilities) needed to define the semantics of probabilis-
tic trace properties. This separation also allows the adversary to be represented
by any program that runs in polynomial time, therefore allowing the soundness
proofs of our logic to be valid in a computational model.
We illustrate the use of the QPCL reasoning principles by proving a “matching-
conversations” style authentication property [6] for a simple initiator-responder
protocol, which states that after the protocol is completed, it is known that the
precise order in which messages are sent and received by the participants of the
protocol was not altered by an adversary. Section 6 contains an outline of the
QPCL proof.
Prior work on formal proof techniques for concrete cryptography [7, 8, 9] has
largely focused on relational techniques where security is proved via game-based
reductions, similar to traditional cryptographic proofs. Proofs of a number of
cryptographic schemes have been mechanized using these techniques. However,
we conjecture that reasoning about the security of cryptographic protocols in-
volves relatively simpler reasoning about trace properties, and that relational
reasoning, while important, does not need to be exposed to the user of a proof
system. In prior work [10], indistinguishability properties such as secrecy have
been proven via stronger trace properties such as key secrecy. Therefore, rela-
tional reasoning in QPCL is pushed down to the level of the soundness proofs
of axioms, which involve a one-time cost to the designers of the proof system;
the users of QPCL need to reason only about trace properties of protocols.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a brief introduction
to concrete security. Section 3 is an overview of the programming language and
the proof system. The programming language for protocols and its operational
semantics is described in Section 4. The syntax, semantics, and proof system for
QPCL are described in Section 5. Section 6 has an outline of the QPCL proof
of the initiator-responder protocol considered in the paper. Section 7 contains
a comparison of QPCL with closely related work.
2 Concrete Security Primer
Concrete security proofs provide bounds for the probability with which an at-
tacker can subvert some security notion for a primitive. These bounds usually
are a function of
1. the security parameter η, which determines the length of keys and random
numbers;1
2. the runtime bound of the adversary, which is often expressed as a polyno-
mial tb(η) of the security parameter; and
3. the number of attempts available to the adversary to break the primi-
tive. As we describe below, the exact definition of the third parameter is
1For ease of presentation, in this paper, we assume that every cryptographic primitive is
governed by the same security parameter η.
3
dependent on the definition of security for that primitive.
In this paper, we study the concrete security of protocols that involve digital
signatures and pseudorandom-number generators; we briefly describe them here.
A digital signature scheme is designed to ensure message unforgeability in
a public key setting. An agent is assigned a private signing key which has an
associated public verification key. A signature scheme Π = (Gen,Sign,Verify)
is specified by a key generation algorithm, Gen, a signing algorithm, Sign, and
a verification algorithm Verify . Gen generates pairs of public and private keys,
Sign produces signatures over messages, and Verify checks that a signature was
generated using the signing key. A characterization of security for a signature
scheme Π is unforgeability under chosen message attacks [11], shortened to
uf-cma, which requires that the probability of the adversary creating a new
message/signature pair, given that he can see q signatures produced by Π over
messages of his choice, is bound by some negligible function uf-cmaΠ (η, tb, q).
A pseudorandom-number generator P is an algorithm that produces numbers
that are distinguishable from numbers drawn from a uniformly random distribu-
tion by a computationally bounded adversary with only negligible probability.
This probability is called the advantage of the adversary against a scheme P ,
and we denote it by prgP (η, tb, q), where q is the number of samples that the
adversary sees before deciding which distribution the samples are drawn from.
Psuedorandom number generators are often used in protocols to generate secrets
that are hard to guess by the adversary.
3 Overview of the Formal System
QPCL is a probabilistic program logic with concrete security bounds for tem-
poral trace properties of cryptographic protocols. A concrete security bound on
an assertion in our logic expresses the probability with which a computation-
ally constrained adversary can violate the assertion in terms of the length of
keys, the runtime of the adversary and the number of concurrent sessions of the
protocol.
3.1 Programming Model
The models on which the logic is interpreted are traces generated by a simple
protocol programming language executing in the presence of an adversary. The
requirements of the logic neccessitate some features of the operational semantics
of the protocol programming language, as the operational semantics defines how
traces are generated from protocol programs interacting in the presence of an
adversary. We now motivate some of these features.
• Concrete Runtime. Reasoning about concrete runtime requires account-
ing for the runtime of every computation in an execution. This runtime
includes that of the adversary as well as protocol programs. The oper-
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ational semantics is defined by a transition system where transitions are
labeled by these runtime costs.
• Concrete Probabilities. Computing probabilistic bounds requires consid-
ering probabilities of sets of traces. The transition system is probabilistic
and the probabilistic branches induce an execution tree, where each path
in the tree is an execution trace. We use the tree to compute the relevant
probabilities.
• Computational completeness. For proofs to be valid in a computational
model, we cannot restrict the adversary to a symbolic model. However,
modeling the adversary explicitly in a Turing-complete language makes
the language very complicated. For proofs of security, which are generally
proofs via reduction to known hard problems, it is possible to ignore the
representation of the adversary. Therefore, we do not explicitly restrict
the adversary’s program to a particular language, but reason only about
its input-output behavior.
• Concurrency and Adversarial Scheduling. Programs execute concurrently;
where the scheduler that switches between programs is controlled by the
adversary. The cost of the computation required by the adversary to make
scheduling decision is accounted for in the runtime of a trace.
3.2 Logic and Proof System
QPCL allows declarative specifications of temporal trace properties, and the
proof system supports reasoning in a manner very similar to first-order reason-
ing. Essentially, axioms related to cryptography have error bounds associated
with them, and these error bounds are propagated throughout the proof to
derive a bound on the final assertion. To aid reasoning about cryptographic
protocols, QPCL supports the following features:
• Temporal Trace Properties. Protocols, such as those involving authen-
tication, often require properties that specify the precise order in which
certain events occur. To allow reasoning about properties such as message
ordering, QPCL supports temporal operators. Traditionally, such proper-
ties are specified using games [12], which imply that the security proofs
typically involve the harder task of proving equivalence of games.
• Concrete Security Bounds. Concrete security bounds on assertions in
QPCL depend on the protocol being reasoned about in a number of ways.
First, protocols specify the implementations of cryptographic primitives
to be used; these define the concrete bounds on the axioms related to
cryptography. Second, concrete bounds on the cryptographic primitives
usually also depend on the number of queries made to the primitive, and
to bound this number on any particular trace, we use the number of times
the cryptographic primitive is called in a protocol.
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(bitstrings) b ::= Aˆ principal name
n nonce
c string constant
s signature
ι session identifier
(thread identifier) I ::= 〈Aˆ, ι〉 thread ι of agent Aˆ
(terms) t ::= x variable
b bitstring
vk(Aˆ) verification key of agent Aˆ
I thread-identifier
〈t, . . . , t〉 tuple
pii(t) i
th component of tuple t
(actions) α ::= send 〈Aˆ, t〉 send a term t to Aˆ
receive receive a term
new generate nonce n
sign t sign term
verify 〈t, t, vk(Aˆ)〉 verify a signature
(program) P ::= stop terminated program
l:x← α;P sequence of actions
(role definition) R ::= r(y) , [P ]I program P with input parameter y
Table 1: Syntax of the Protocol Programming Language
• Safety Properties. Finally, since concrete security involves computing the
probability of a property being violated as a function of the time available
to the adversary, the total runtime of a trace is bounded; traces end when
the total time elapsed is greater than the specified time bound. Thus,
we cannot talk about liveness properties (i.e., things that will eventually
happen) in QPCL.
4 Protocol Programming Language
We now describe the syntax and semantics of the protocol programming lan-
guage QPCL.
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4.1 Protocol Syntax
4.1.1 Syntax: Overview
The protocol programming language is used to represent cryptographic proto-
cols between principals. The language is used to describe the set of roles that
comprises a cryptographic protocol. Roles are programs that honest partici-
pants of the protocol run instances of. For example, the widely used SSL/TLS
protocol has two roles for servers and clients. Each program is a sequence of
actions that represent stateful probabilistic computations on bitstrings. Ex-
amples of actions are network communication and cryptographic computations
such as message signing and verification. A bitstring may denote a principal
name, nonce, string constant, signature, or a session identifier. As a matter of
convention, the metavariable (Aˆ, n, etc.) that we use to refer to a particular
bitstring denotes its intended usage (resp. principal name, nonce, etc.). The
syntax of the programming language is summarized in Table 1 and explained
below.
Names, sessions and thread identifiers Honest principals can execute
multiple instances of different protocol roles. A thread, which is an instance of
a protocol role executed by an honest principal, is associated with a thread iden-
tifier 〈Aˆ, ι〉, a pair containing the principal name Aˆ and a session identifier ι. If
I is a thread identifier, pi1(I) is the principal executing the thread.2 Each thread
is assumed to have been assigned an asymmetric signing-verification key pair.3
All threads of a principal Aˆ share the same key pair, denoted (sk(Aˆ), vk(Aˆ)). A
signing key sk(Aˆ) is not a term in the programming language, since we do not
allow signing keys to appear in messages of a protocol.
Terms, Actions, and Programs The term language is composed of vari-
ables, bitstrings, verification keys, thread identifiers, tuples and projections.
Actions represent stateful computations on bitstrings that return bitstrings.
Examples of actions are nonce generation, signing, verification, and communica-
tion (sending and receiving). An action statement x← α denotes the binding of
variable x to the result of the action α. We assume that every bound variable is
unique; uniqueness can be ensured by systematically renaming variables. Each
action statement has a unique label l. Actions have the form of a(t), where a
is a name for the action and t is the input. As a matter of convenience, action
labels are not shown explicitly in our examples.
Programs are sequences of action statements. We use the notation [t/x]P
to denote substituting term t for variable x in program P (renaming bound
variables if necessary to avoid capture).
2pii represents the ith projection.
3We do not reason about key exchange in the logic, and assume keys are pre-assigned
before the protocol executes.
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A→ B : m
B → A : n, SIGB{|“Resp”, n,m,A|}
A→ B : SIGA{|“Init”, n,m,B|}
Figure 1: Challenge-response protocol as arrows-and-messages
Role Definitions and Protocols A role is a program, instantiations of which
are run by honest participants of a protocol. It is defined using a role definition
of the form of r(y) , [P ]I , which identifies a program P with a name r and
the input parameters y for the role. Every role has an additional parameter,
denoted by the subscript I, for the thread identifier associated with a particular
instance of this role. Every variable in a role is bound, and is either a parameter
or assigned to in an action statement. A protocol specifies a finite list of roles.
Example Protocol The two roles of the challenge-response protocol depicted
informally in Figure 1 are written formally in Figure 2, with InitCR the initia-
tor role and RespCR the responder role. The initiator role InitCR begins with
a static parameter Yˆ , which is the name of the agent that the initiator intends
to communicate with. If an agent Alice, for example, uses InitCR to authen-
ticate an agent Bob using the CR protocol, then Alice executes the instance
InitCR(Bob) of the initiator role obtained by substituting Bob for the static
parameter Yˆ . The value of the static parameters (the choice of the intended
responder in this case) is chosen by the adversary before a role is executed.
In words, the actions of a principal executing the role InitCR are: generate
a fresh random number; send a message with the random number to the peer
Yˆ ; receive a message with source address Yˆ ; verify that the message contains
Yˆ ’s signature over the data in the expected format; and finally, send another
message to Yˆ with the initiator’s signature over the nonce sent in the first
message, the nonce received from Yˆ , and Yˆ ’s identity. The subscript X on the
square brackets [ . . . ]X enclosing the actions of InitCR indicate that X is the
thread-identifier of the thread executing these actions. X is a pair 〈Xˆ, ι〉 for
some principal Xˆ, and thread name ι. A role [ . . . ]X may include an action
that signs a message with the private key of Xˆ, but not with the private key of
Yˆ unless Yˆ = Xˆ.
To simplify the presentation, we use pattern-matching notation such (〈x1, x2〉 ←
α;P ) for binding more than one variable in an action statement involving
tuples. This should be read as the program with the variables in the pat-
tern replaced with the correct component of the tuple in the rest of the pro-
gram. For example, the above program should be read as shorthand for (x ←
α; [pi1(x)/x1, pi2(x)/x2]P ). We also use _ in place of a variable when the return
value from an action is never used.
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InitCR(Yˆ ) , [
m← new ;
_← send 〈Yˆ ,m〉;
〈〈y, s〉, N ′〉 ← receive;
_← verify 〈s, 〈“Resp”, y,m, Xˆ〉, vk(Yˆ )〉;
r ← sign〈“Init”, y,m, Yˆ 〉;
_← send 〈Yˆ , r〉;
stop
]X
RespCR() , [
〈x, Xˆ〉 ← receive;
n← new ;
r ← sign〈“Resp”, n, x, Xˆ〉;
_← send 〈Xˆ, 〈n, r〉〉;
〈t,N ′′〉 ← receive;
_← verify〈t, 〈“Init”, n, x, Yˆ 〉, vk(Xˆ)〉;
stop
]Y
Figure 2: Roles of the Challenge-response protocol
4.2 Semantics
The semantics of the protocol programming language describe how protocol
programs interact in the presence of an adversary who is allowed to execute
arbitrary polynomial-time computations.
4.2.1 Semantics: Overview
The semantics describe the interleaved execution of a collection of protocol
programs to produce traces. At a given point in time, at most one protocol
program in a collection is active, while other programs wait to be executed.
Recall that a program is a list of actions. We describe how each action is
executed and how actions in different programs are interleaved.
Individual actions are executed by invoking stateful probabilistic computa-
tions on bitstrings called action implementations. For example, informally, to
execute a signature-signing action, the input to the sign action is passed to
an implementation of digital signature schemes that maintains its own state.
Similarly, to execute the sending of a message, the input to the send action is
sent to the adversary, who is responsible for relaying messages. After the com-
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putation implementing the action has finished executing and returns a value,
the remainder of the active program continues execution. Certain actions are
allowed to make scheduling decisions instead of simply returning values. For
example, the receive action is allowed to signal the active program to wait, sim-
ulating the adversary’s power to make scheduling choices when a program is
waiting to receive a message. A special computation, the scheduler, is invoked
when all threads are waiting.
The adversary controls the scheduler and the send and receive actions, and is
allowed to run arbitrary computations when these actions are invoked. In effect,
the adversary controls network communication and the scheduling of protocol
threads.4 However, the time for executing every action in a trace is recorded
and the total runtime of every trace is bounded by a polynomial of the security
parameter, which corresponds to a polynomially bounded adversary.
Action transitions represent the behavior of action implementations, the
stateful probabilistic computations that implement actions. Action transitions
take as input a state for the action implementation and an input bitstring and
return a distribution over updated states and output bitstrings.
Terms such as projections of pairs are resolved down to values representing
bitstrings before an action is invoked on such a term. Such stateless computa-
tions are represented by the term-evaluation relation. Finally, action transitions
along with the term-evaluation relation are used in defining configuration tran-
sitions that describe how individual actions are executed and different protocol
programs are interleaved.
4.2.2 Semantics: Details and Examples
We now describe term-evaluation and action transitions, and then define con-
figuration transitions formally.
Term Evaluation and Values Terms represent deterministic, effect-free
computations on bitstrings. Values are closed terms that cannot be simpli-
fied further, namely, bitstrings and tuples of bitstrings. The evaluation of term
t to value v with cost c is denoted by the term-evaluation relation t ⇓c v. For
example, we have that pi1(〈A,B〉) ⇓c A, for some cost c.
Implementations and Implementation Transitions Implementations are
stateful probabilistic computations on bitstrings corresponding to each action
in the programming language. A special implementation, the scheduler Sr,
does not correspond to any action, but is responsible for scheduling when no
programs are active.
Implementation transitions are probabilistic transition relations that de-
scribe the behavior of action implementations. The observable behavior of
4The adversary is also allowed to return garbage values after executing actions that are
not parsable as terms, but such values are ignored. Therefore, we make the assumption that
all return values of actions are parsable as terms.
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implementations includes the cost of computing a particular result and the prob-
ability with which the particular result is computed. The following transition
relation represents one outcome of executing implementation A on input t:
σ,A(t)
c,p7−−→ σ′, ra.
Here, σ denotes the state maintained by A, c denotes the cost of the outcome,
p denotes its probability, σ′ denotes the output state and ra denotes the result
of the computation (called the reaction), which has the following form:
ra ::= ret(t) | abort | wait | switch[I].
The reaction can either return a value of the expected type (ret(t)), signal the
active program to abort (abort) or wait (wait), or force a context switch to
the thread with identifier I (switch[I]). For example, an implementation of the
signature verification action may return if the verification succeeds; otherwise,
it can signal the thread to stop. The state maintained by an implementation is
treated abstractly by the operational semantics. We have deliberately left the
low-level details of states unspecified. The soundness proofs do not depend on
the specifics of the implementations. Moreover, adversaries modeled using such
an abstract representation are allowed to implement arbitrary data structures
to mount efficient attacks on the protocol. To build intuition, we now provide
examples of simple instances of implementation transitions.
Consider a deterministic implementation Sign of the signature action that
keeps a count only of the number of messages it has signed as its state. In this
case, the action transition has the following form:
n, Sign(m)
c,17−−→ n+ 1, ret(s).
Next, consider an example where an implementation Verify of the signature
verification action verify fails to verify a signature:
〈〉,Verify(〈m,m′, vk(N)〉) c,17−−→ 〈〉, abort.
The implementation Verify does not maintain any state; its state is thus denoted
〈〉.
Now consider an implementation Send of the send action whose state is a
set s of sent messages that corresponds to an adversary who randomly drops
half the messages:
s, Send(〈Aˆ,m〉) c,0.57−−−→ s, ret(〈〉)
s, Send(〈Aˆ,m〉) c,0.57−−−→ s ∪ {〈Aˆ,m〉}, ret(〈〉).
In the first outcome above, the implementation Send keeps the set of sent mes-
sages unchanged, effectively dropping the message m. In the second outcome,
Send updates the state s with the new message. In both outcomes, the null
tuple 〈〉 is returned.
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Action Type Reactions
new unit→ nonce ret(t)
send principal_name× message→ unit ret(t)
receive unit→ principal_name× message ret(t), wait
sign message× sgn_key→ message ret(t)
verify message× message× sgn_key→ unit ret(t), abort
Table 2: Types and permitted reactions for actions
Consider an implementation Receive of the receive action that signals the
active program to wait when it has no messages to relay:
{}, Receive(〈〉) c,17−−→ {}, wait.
Finally, switch[I] is used by the scheduler to indicate a switch to the thread
with identifier I. For example, a scheduler Sr that manages a list of n threads
and picks one at random has the following transition for each k:
{I1 · · · In}, Sr
c, 1n7−−→ {I1 · · · In}, switch[Ik].
We require that the number of possible transitions from a given state be
finite and that the transition probabilities sum to 1. For example, if for the
state σ, implementation A, and input t, the possible transitions are
σ,A(t)
c1,p17−−−→ σ′1, ra1 . . . σ, A(t) cn,pn7−−−→ σ′n, ran,
then we require that
∑n
i=1 pi = 1 and that for all i, pi > 0.
Setup A setup S is a mapping 〈〈.〉〉I that associates an action a with an
action implementation 〈〈a〉〉I for the thread with identifier I, along with an
implementation Sr for the scheduler. We will see below that only the part of
the setup that pertains to cryptography is specified by a protocol.
Restrictions on Actions We make well-typing assumptions about the reac-
tions of action implementations. These assumptions are easily discharged, since
straightforward checks can identify when responses are not the expected type,
and ignore them. Associated with each action is a type and a set of allowed
reactions; these are summarized in Table 2 and described here. For instance,
according to the table, the only reaction allowed for action send〈Aˆ, t〉 is ret(〈〉);
a context switch is not allowed on a send. The implementation for receive can
respond with ret(t) or wait. This means that a context switch can be enforced
during a receive action. The fact that only receive can respond with a switch
means that each thread executes its program uninterrupted until it reaches a
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receive action; at this point, the adversary has the opportunity to schedule
other threads.
The action new would typically be implemented by a pseudorandom-number
generator, and can respond only with ret(t).
The action sign returns ret(t); verify may respond with a ret(〈〉) on
success or abort on failure. These actions would typically be implemented by
a digital signature scheme.
An implementation may either be specified by the protocol setup or be pro-
vided by the adversary. For cryptographic protocols, it may be reasonable to
expect that implementations for send and receive are provided by the adver-
sary, as it controls the communication channel and is responsible for scheduling
processes. The implementations for sign, verify, and new are specified by
the protocol according to its choice of signature algorithm and pseudorandom-
number generator.
Configuration Transitions Finally, configuration transitions describe how
protocol programs are executed and interleaved to produce traces. A configu-
ration is a snapshot of the execution of all computation in our system. This
snapshot includes each of the protocol programs and the state of each imple-
mentation. Formally, a configuration C has the form E{Ψ B T} . Ψ is a set
of waiting threads, where each thread has the form I : P , consisting of I, the
thread-identifier, and P , the program. T , the thread after the wedge, is the
active program being processed. When no program is active, a configuration is
denoted E{Ψ B ·}. E, known as the global state, is the collection of the states
for the action implementations.
Global State The structure of the global state E captures which action im-
plementations are allowed to share information. For example, the adversary is
allowed to combine any information that he infers from scheduling or that he
receives from the network. However, we require that the pseudorandom-number
generators from different threads operate on different states. The global state
is a set that has the form {h1 : σ1, · · · , hk : σk}, where each σi is a local state
for some action implementation. The label hi determines which implementation
state σi belongs to. Implementations that share state have the same label in the
global state. We need to define for each action how the label for that action in
the global state is determined. The label of an action a in a thread with identifier
I in the global state is denoted
∼
aI . If the implementations of action a in thread I
and action b in thread I ′ operate on the same state, then we want that
∼
aI =
∼
bI′ .
Otherwise, if the actions operate on separate states, then we want
∼
aI 6=
∼
bI′ . The
send and receive actions, which are implemented by the adversary, share state
for every thread. So, for all I, we choose
∼
sendI =
∼
receiveI = a, for a constant
symbol a. On the other hand, the sign and verify actions have separate state
for each principal, so we parameterize the label of these actions with a principal,
denoting them
∼
sendI =
∼
verifyI = s(pi1(I)) for a symbol s (recall that pi1(I)
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t ⇓c′ v σ, 〈〈a〉〉I(v) c,p7−−→ σ′, ret(v′)
E,
∼
aI : σ{ΨB I : x← a(t);P} c+c
′,p−−−−−−→
(I,a(v),v′)
E,
∼
aI : σ
′{ΨB I : [v′/x]P}
(act)
t ⇓c′ v σ, 〈〈a〉〉I(v) c,p7−−→ σ′, abort
E,
∼
aI : σ{ΨB I : x← a(t);P} c+c
′,p−−−−→ E, ∼aI : σ′{ΨB ·}
(abort)
t ⇓c′ v σ, 〈〈a〉〉I(v) c,p7−−→ σ′, wait
E,
∼
aI : σ{ΨB I : x← a(t);P} c+c
′,p−−−−→ E, ∼aI : σ′{Ψ, I : x← a(t);P B ·}
(wait)
σ, Sr
c,p7−−→ σ′, switch[I]
E,
∼
Sr : σ{Ψ, I : P B ·} c,p−−→ E,
∼
Sr : σ′{ΨB I : P}
(switch)
Table 3: Operational Semantics for the Protocol Language
is the principal corresponding to I). The action new has a separate state for
each thread, so we denote its label
∼
newI = p(I), for a symbol p. Finally, the
scheduler Sr is implemented by the adversary, so Sr’s label in the global state
is a, the same as that of send and receive.
Configuration transitions have the form C c,p−−→ C′, where c and p denote
the runtime cost and probability of the transition. Transitions where an action
executes to return some value carry a record of the action below the arrow. This
record has the form (I, a(v), v′), where I is the active thread, a(v) is the action
executed and v′ is the value returned. (See rule act below.)
We now present rules for the evolution of configurations. These rules are
parametric in the transitions for evaluation of actions and terms. Table 3
presents the transition rules for configurations.5
The first three rules, act, abort, and wait, describe how a single action in the
active program is executed. In each of these rules, 〈〈a〉〉I is the implementation of
the action a for thread I, as per the setup. Each rule describes how a statement
is executed. First the input to the action is evaluated to a value v; then the
implementation 〈〈a〉〉I is run on v to yield a new state σ′ and a reaction, and
the change in state is reflected in the global state. According to rule act, when
〈〈a〉〉I returns a value v′, the active program x← a(t);P transitions to [v′/x]P ,
where all occurences of the variable x are replaced with v′. For example, for
the signature action sign, when the implementation 〈〈sign〉〉I is called on some
message m, whe implementation returns a signature for m. On the other hand,
when the implementation responds with abort, the current program is stopped.
5In the transition rules, the notation Ψ, I : P denotes Ψ ∪ {I : P}; similarly, E, ∼aI : σ
denotes E ∪ {∼aI : σ}.
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Similarly, when the implementation responds with wait, the active program is
moved to the set of waiting programs.
The rule switch describes how different programs in a configuration are in-
terleaved. When an implementation responds with switch[I ′], the thread I ′ is
made the active program.
In each rule, the total computation cost and the probability are recorded in
the transition. The transitions due to act contain a record of the action executed
in the transition and the value returned. Such transitions will be referred to as
labeled transitions.
Execution Traces A trace L is a sequence of configuration transitions. A
trace records the actions in the execution of the protocol, the runtime cost
incurred, and its probability. We say that the action label (I, a(t), t′) ∈ L if L
contains a labeled transition C c,p−−−−−−→
(I,a(t),t′)
C′. We also define a function rt(L),
which returns the total cost of execution of the trace (i.e., the sum of the runtime
costs for each transition), and a function p(L), which returns the probability of
the trace (i.e., the product of the probabilities for each transition). The relation
L1  L2 denotes that L1 is a prefix of L2.
Execution Trees An execution tree B rooted at a configuration C is either the
configuration C, or has the form (C p1,c1−−−→ B1 | · · · | C pk,ck−−−→ Bk), where C p1,c1−−−→
C1, · · · C pk,ck−−−→ Ck are valid transitions from C and B1, · · · ,Bk are execution trees
rooted at C1, · · · , Ck, respectively.
Informally, a tree B is a branching structure of configuration transitions. We
write L ∈ B if L is a path in B. Every path through a tree is a trace. We extend
p to finite trees by taking p (B) = ∑L∈B p (L).
Initialization and Termination For a protocol with roles {R1, R2, . . . , Rk},
the instance vector ~n = 〈n1, n2, . . . , nk〉 denotes the number of instances of each
of the k protocol roles; the initialization vector ~t = 〈~t1, ~t2, . . . , ~tk〉 is a vector
of vectors, where ~ti is a list of values corresponding to the input parameters of
all instances of the ith role. Given an initialization vector, the initial config-
uration consists of all the instances of protocol roles running on each thread,
where values from the initialization vector are substituted for the corresponding
parameters.
Protocol A protocol Q, is a pair (~R,SQ), where ~R is a list of protocol roles,
and SQ is a mapping from actions to implementations for actions corresponding
to cryptography, namely, sign, verify, and new.
Adversary An adversary A is a pair (~t,SA), where SA is the setup for the
send and receive actions and the scheduler, and ~t is the initialization vector.
The remainder of the setup, in particular, the implementations for the signature
and pseudorandom-number generation actions, is specified by the protocol.
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Given a runtime bound tb(η) that is a polynomial of the security parameter
η, a trace L is considered final if all threads are terminated or if there exists a
transition from the last state such that the total runtime exceeds tb(η). A tree
B is considered final if all traces in B are final.
Definition 1. (Feasible Traces) For a protocol Q, setup S, instance vector
~n, initialization vector ~t, and polynomial tb(η) that bounds the running time,
TQ(S, t, ~n, tb, η) is the final tree obtained starting from the initial configuration.
Given an adversary A that provides implementations SA and initial values ~t,
and a protocol Q that provides implementations SQ, the execution tree is written
as TQ,A(η, tb, ~n) = TQ(SA ∪ SQ,~t, ~n, tb, η).
The function TQ,A serves as the model on which QPCL formulas are inter-
preted.
5 Quantitative Protocol Composition Logic
In this section, we present the syntax, semantics, and proof system for Quantita-
tive Protocol Composition Logic (QPCL). While the logic is similar to Compu-
tational PCL [3], the key technical difference is that we can specify and reason
about exact security trace properties in QPCL. Specifically, the axioms and
proof rules of the logic are annotated with exact bounds, thereby enabling an
exact bound to be derived from a formal axiomatic proof of a security property.
QPCL consists of two kinds of formulas: basic formulas that do not involve
probability and are interpreted on execution traces; and conditional formulas of
the form of ϕ1 → ϕ2 that are annotated with a probability function  and are
interpreted on execution trees. The probability function  is parameterized by
the security parameter, adversary runtime, and number of sessions of the pro-
tocol, and specifies, for a particular setting of these parameters, the probability
of the conditional implication not holding.
5.1 Syntax
The syntax of formulas is given in Table 4. We summarize the meaning of
formulas informally below, with precise semantics presented subsequently.
Basic formulas do not involve probabilities, and are interpreted over execu-
tion traces. We use the same syntax for terms and variables in formulas as for
terms and variables in the protocol programming language. For every protocol
action, there is a corresponding action predicate that asserts that the action
has occurred on the trace. For example, Send(I, t) holds on a trace where the
thread with thread-identifier I has sent the term t, while New(I, t) holds on a
trace where the thread I has created the term t using the random nonce gen-
eration action. Similarly, Sign(I, t, t′) holds when a signature t for message t′
has been generated, and Verify(I, t, t′, Bˆ) holds when t has been verified to be
Bˆ’s signature over t′. Contains(t, t′) holds on a trace if t can be derived from t′
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Action Predicates:
a ::= Send(I, t) |Receive(I, t) |Sign(I, s, t) |
Verify(I, s, t, Bˆ) |New(I, t)
Basic Formulas:
ϕ ::= a | a < a′ | t = t′ |Start(T ) |Contains(t, t′) |
Honest(Bˆ) |ϕ ∧ ϕ′ | ¬ϕ |ϕ [program]I ϕ′ | ∀x.ϕ
Conditional formulas:
ψ ::= ϕ | (ϕ → ϕ′) |ψ ∧ ψ′ | ¬ψ | ∀x.ψ
Table 4: Syntax of the logic
using symbolic actions, such as projection and message-recovery from a signa-
ture. Honest(Bˆ) holds if Bˆ is a principal associated with a protocol thread. We
use Fresh(I, t) as syntactic sugar for the formula New(I, t) ∧ ∀t′(Send(I, t′) ⇒
¬Contains(t, t′)), which means that the value of t generated by I is “fresh” in
the sense that I generated t using a new action and did not send out any mes-
sage containing t. We use FirstSend(I, n,m) as syntactic sugar for the formula
Contains(n,m) ∧ ∀t.((New(I, n) ∧ Send(I, t) < Send(I,m))⇒ ¬Contains(n, t)).
The logic includes modal formulas of the form ϕ1[program]Iϕ2, where program
is a fragment of some protocol’s program. This formula holds on a trace L if,
roughly speaking, whenever L can be split into three parts, L1, L2, and L3 (so
that L = L1;L2;L3) such that L2 “matches” program and ϕ1 holds on trace L1,
then ϕ2 holds on L1;L2.
The logic also includes standard connectives and quantifiers of first-order
logic. In addition, we have conditional formulas of the form ϕ → ϕ′. As we
said in the introduction,  here is a function. Its arguments are η (the security
parameter), tb (the adversary’s time bound), and ~n (the number of instances of
each role of the protocol being analyzed). The formula ϕ → ϕ′ holds if the
conditional probability of ϕ′ given ϕ is greater than or equal to 1 − (η, tb, ~n),
for every setting of η, tb and ~n. Conditional formulas are interpreted over
execution trees parameterized by η, tb and ~n. While the syntax of QPCL allows
arbitrary functions of η, tb and ~n to be used in conditional formulas, we will
see in Section 5.3 that formulas provable using QPCL’s proofsystem use a very
restricted set of functions, which is the set of linear combinations of the bounds
on QPCL’s axioms.
We abbreviate a special case of the conditional formula of the form true→ ϕ
as Bϕ. Such formulas will prove useful for specifying exact security properties
of cryptographic primitives (such as signature schemes) and protocols (such as
matching conversation-style authentication properties [12]).
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5.2 Semantics
Basic formulas are interpreted over traces, whereas conditional formulas are
interpreted over execution trees.
For basic formulas, we define the semantic relation L, V |= ϕ denoting that
basic formula ϕ holds on trace L, where V is a valuation that maps variables
to values. The notation V [x 7→ v] denotes the valuation that is identical to V
except that it maps variable x to value v. Recall that all bound variables are
assumed to be unique, as uniqueness can be ensured via renaming. The lifting
of V from variables to terms is denoted Vˆ . Vˆ (t) yields a value after replacing
each variable in t by V (x). We write L |= ϕ if, for all V , L, V |= ϕ.
For conditional formulas, we define the semantic relation T , (η, tb, ~n), V |= ψ.
Here, T is a function that, like , takes parameters η, tb, and ~n; T (η, tb, ~n) is an
execution tree. We write T , V |= ψ if T , (η, tb, ~n), V |= ψ for all inputs (η, tb, ~n).
Recall from Definition 1 that a protocol Q and an adversary A define a model
TQ,A. TQ,A(η, tb, ~n) is the set of traces of protocol Q generated using adversary
A, security parameter η, time bound tb(η) on the adversary’s running time, and
number of instances of each protocol role given by ~n = 〈n1, . . . , nk〉. For a set
∆ of formulas, we define
∆ |=Q ψ iff TQ,A, V |= ∆ implies TQ,A, V |= ψ for all adversaries A, and valuations V .
Definition of L, V |= ψ We start by giving the semantics of basic formulas.
in the definition below, where the different elements of the trace are given by
Definition 1.
• L, V |= Send(I, u) iff (Vˆ (I), send Vˆ (u), 〈〉) ∈ L.
• L, V |= Receive(I, u) iff (Vˆ (I), receive , Vˆ (u)) ∈ L.
• L, V |= Sign(I, u, u′) iff (Vˆ (I), sign Vˆ (u′), Vˆ (u)) ∈ L.
• L, V |= Verify(I, w, u, Bˆ) iff (Vˆ (I), verify 〈Vˆ (w), Vˆ (u), vk(Vˆ (Bˆ))〉, 〈〉) ∈
L.
• L, V |= New(I, u) iff (Vˆ (I), new, Vˆ (u)) ∈ L.
• L, V |= a1 < a2 iff L, V |= a1, L, V |= a2, and a1 appears before a2 in
L, where a1 and a2 are the actions in L corresponding to a1 and a2,
respectively. (Informally, this predicate models the temporal ordering on
actions.)
• L, V |= u = v if V (u) = V (v), where = is equality on values.
• L, V |= Start(I) if no action label in L has the form (Vˆ (I), ., .). (Intuitively,
this predicate holds on traces in which the thread with identifier I has
executed no actions.)
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• L, V |= Contains(u, v) iff there exists a series of identity function applica-
tions, projections, and message-recovery operations from signatures (de-
riving message from its signature) constructing Vˆ (u) from Vˆ (v).
• L, V |= Honest(Aˆ) iff Aˆ is a principal executing a protocol role on L.
• L, V |= θ ∧ ϕ iff L, V |= θ and L, V |= ϕ.
• L, V |= ¬ϕ iff L, V 6|= ϕ.
We next define the semantics of modal formulas of the form θ[P ]Xϕ. As we
said above, intuitively, θ[P ]Iϕ is true on a trace L if, when L is split into three
pieces L1;L2;L3, if L2 “matches” the program [P ]I , and if the precondition θ
holds for the trace L1, then the postcondition ϕ holds for the trace L1;L2. In
order to make this intuitive idea precise, we define a notion of matching a pro-
gram [P ]I to a suffix of a trace. Variables in the postcondition ϕ can be bound
to variables declared within P . Matching [P ]I to a trace may place constraints
on how these variables are interpreted by a valuation. For example, consider
the formula true[x ← new]INew(I, x), where x is bound within the program.
On matching the program to a trace, a concrete value of x for the particular
trace is obtained, which is used to evaluate the postcondition New(I, x).
We define what it means for a trace L and valuation V to match program
[P ]I between prefixes Lb and Le and produce a valuation V ′, denoted L, V 
[P ]I |Lb,Le, V ′, by induction on [P ]I :
• L, V  [l : x← α]I |L1,L2, V [x 7→ t] if L2  L and L2 ends in a transition
C c−−−−−−−−−→
(Vˆ (I),Vˆ (α),t)
C′ for some configurations C, C′.
• L, V  [l : x ← α;P ]I |L1,L2, V ′, if there exist L′1, L′2, and V1 such that
(a) L, V  [l : x← α]|L1,L′1, V1 and (b) L, V1  [P ]I |L′2,L2, V ′.
The semantics of the modal formula can now be defined as follows:
• L, V |= θ[P ]Iϕ iff, for all L1, L2, and valuations V ′, if L, V  [P ]I |L1,L2, V ′
and L1, V |= θ, then L2, V ′ |= ϕ.
Finally, we give semantics to the universal quantifier in the standard way:
• L, V |= ∀x. ϕ iff L, V [x 7→ v] |= ϕ holds for all values v. Note that as
with the protocol programming language, the set of values is the set of all
bitstrings and tuples of bitstrings.
Definition of T , (η, tb, ~n), V |= ψ We now give the semantics of θ → ϕ,
where θ and ϕ are basic formulas. In order to do so, we associate with each basic
formula ϕ a function [[ϕ]] from execution trees to execution trees. Intuitively,
for each execution tree B, [[ϕ]]V (B) is the tree composed of those traces that
satisfy ϕ under valuation V . Since all basic formulas ϕ are trace properties,
[[ϕ]]V (B) = {L ∈ B| L, V |= ϕ}. The formula θ → ϕ is intended to express the
fact that the probability of ϕ given θ is within  of 1. But since  is a function
of η, tb, ~n, the semantic relation is parameterized by η, tb, ~n. We have
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• T , (η, tb, ~n), V |= ϕ if [[ϕ]]V (T (η, tb, ~n)) = T (η, tb, ~n)
• T , (η, tb, ~n), V |= θ → ϕ if
p
(
[[ϕ]]V (T (η, tb, ~n)) ∩ [[θ]]V (T (η, tb, ~n)) )
p ( [[θ]]V (T (η, tb, ~n)) ) ≥ 1− (η, tb, ~n),
where we take the ratio to be 1 if p
(
[[θ]]V (T (η, tb, ~n))
)
= 0.
Recall that Bϕ is the special case of θ → ϕ where θ = true. Also, it can
be shown that p ( T (η, tb, ~n) ) = 1. Thus, we have
• T , (η, tb, ~n), V |= Bϕ if
p
(
[[ϕ]]V (T (η, tb, ~n)) ) ≥ 1− (η, tb, ~n).
Boolean operations and universal quantification over conditional formulas
are defined the same way as for basic formulas.
• T , (η, tb, ~n), V |= ψ1 ∧ψ2 iff T , (η, tb, ~n), V |= ψ1 and T , (η, tb, ~n), V |= ψ2.
• T , (η, tb, ~n), V |= ¬ψ iff T , (η, tb, ~n), V 6|= ψ.
• T , (η, tb, ~n), V |= ∀x. ψ iff T , (η, tb, ~n), V [x 7→ v] |= ψ holds for all values
v.
Example (Authentication Property) Informally, a matching conversa-
tions property states that after an agent executes a particular role, it is known
that all the messages sent during the role were actually received by the intended
recipient, except possibly the last one. This means that the role of the adver-
sary is limited to that of a wire, faithfully transferring messages to its intended
recipients.
In the running example, a matching-conversations form of the authentication
property from the point of view of an initiator is formally expressed in QPCL
as:
B(true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A∃ι.
(Send(A,m) < Receive(B,m)∧
Receive(B,m) < Send(B, 〈y, s〉)∧
Send(B, 〈y, s〉) < Receive(A, 〈y, s〉))).
(1)
In formula (1), B is the thread identifier 〈Bˆ, ι〉. Intuitively, the formula says
that, with uncertainty , after A executes the initiator’s InitCR role for the
example challenge-response protocol, the messages between A and responder B
occur in order in all but a fraction  of traces of the protocol. Moreover, the
proof of the protocol gives us a concrete bound on  that is roughly6
uf-cmaS (tb, ninit + nresp, η) + 2 · 2−η + 2prgP (tb, ninit + nresp, η).
6The actual bound involves a few more terms, and is presented in Section 6.
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Here, S is the signature scheme and P is the pseudorandom-number generator
used in the protocol. Recall from Section 2 that uf-cmaS is the exact bound on
the uf-cma security of the signature scheme S and prgP is the exact bound on the
prg security of the pseudorandom-number generator P . Also, ninit and nresp
are the number of sessions of the initiator and the responder roles, respectively.
The overall bound on the security of the protocol is therefore closely related to
the security of the underlying cryptographic primitives. An outline of the proof
of this formula is given in Section 6; a complete proof is provided in Appendix
A.2.
5.3 QPCL Proof System
The proof system for QPCL includes axioms that capture properties of crypto-
graphic primitives (e.g., unforgeability of signatures), a rule for proving invari-
ants of protocol programs (useful for reasoning about properties that capture
the behavior of honest principals executing one or more instances of protocol
roles), as well as axioms and rules for first-order reasoning about belief formulas.
All axioms are annotated with exact bounds. Inference rules compute bounds
for the formula in the consequent from the bounds of formulas in the antecedent
(e.g., the conjunction of two belief formulas has a bound that is the sum of the
bounds for the two formulas). Since a proof of a security property can be vi-
sualized as a tree with axioms at the leaves and rules at intermediate nodes,
tracking bounds in this manner ensures that the axiomatic proof yields an exact
bound for the final property that is proved.
The exact bound in some of the axioms depends on the protocol Q whose
correctness we are trying to prove. As a consequence, the entailment relation
`Q is parameterized by the protocol Q. Axioms that are sound for any protocol
are marked by the unparameterized entailment relation `.
The exact bound  is a function of the number of instances of the protocol
roles ~n, the security parameter η, and the running time of the adversary tb(η).
Axioms related to cryptography introduce error bounds, while other proof rules
simply accumulate these bounds. As a result, error bounds of formulas provable
in QPCL are linear combinations of the error bounds introduced by the axioms
related to cryptography. In the present version of QPCL, error bounds have one
of the following forms:
 ::= 0 | VER | FS2 | 1 + 2.
Here, VER and FS2 are functions that represent the concrete bounds of axioms
VER and FS2 discussed below, and 1 + 2 is the function that is pointwise
addition of 1 and 2.
The main technical result of this section is that the proof system is sound,
that is, given protocol Q, ~n, η, and tb, each provable formula Bϕ holds in each
of the semantic models defined by Q, ~n, η and tb(η) with probability at least
1− (~n, η, tb).
The soundness proofs for axioms capturing properties of cryptographic prim-
itives are done via exact security reductions; they tightly relate associated
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bounds to the bounds for the underlying primitive (e.g., digital signature or
pseudorandom-number generator). The exact security reduction proofs pro-
ceed by showing that with high probability, whenever a violation of an axiom is
detected on a trace, with high probability, a violation of the cryptographic prim-
itive can be constructed. To detect a violation of an axiom on a trace, however,
additional computation needs to be performed, which weakens the probability
bound on the protocol. Essentially, the reduction proof says that an adversary
can break an axiom in time t if an adversary can break the corresponding prim-
itive t+ δ. We call δ the reduction overhead. Specifying a concrete bound for δ
requires implementation details of the reduction such as the hardware on which
the reduction is implemented. We elide these details in the paper. Appendix
5.4 contains the reductions for axioms involving cryptography. The exact bound
for the reduction overhead for an axiom can be computed for any concrete im-
plementation of the reduction. We are satisfied when the overhead is a small
polynomial in the security parameters and number of sessions.
We summarize below some representative axioms and proof rules (additional
inference rules and detailed soundness proofs are in Appendix 5.4).
Axioms about cryptographic primitives The axiom below captures the
hardness of forging signatures. The natural reading is that if thread Y verified
the signature of principal Bˆ, then some thread ι of that principal must have
produced the signature. There is one instance of this axiom for each fixed
(constant) principal Bˆ.
VER. ∆,Honest(Bˆ) `Q BVER(Verify(Y, s,m, Bˆ)
⇒ ∃ι.Sign(〈Bˆ, ι〉, s,m) < Verify(Y, s,m, Bˆ)).
Axiom VER is not sound in general. It is sound only if the bound VER is
chosen appropriately for the protocol Q (which is why we use the notation `Q).
The appropriate choice of the bound is closely related to uf-cmaS , the security
bound for the signature scheme. If Q involves the protocol roles R1, . . . , Rk,
then we define VER as follows:
VER(η, tb, ~n) = 
uf-cma
S (η, tb+ δ, q),
where q = Σki=1 (ni × qi) is a bound on the total number of signing actions on
a trace, ni is the number of instances of Ri in Q, qi is the number of signing
actions in role Ri, and δ is the reduction overhead for the axiom that can be
bounded by a polynomial that is O(q2i η).7
The next axiom captures the hardness of predicting random nonces gener-
ated using a pseudorandom-number generator (PRG). It states that if thread
with identifier X generated nonce n and sent it out for the first time in message
m, then if n is computable from a message m′ received by thread Y , then that
receive action must have occurred after the send action by thread X.
7The concrete reduction for VER is given in Algorithm 1 in Section 5.4. The overhead δ
is the concrete runtime for the reduction.
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FS2.
∆ `Q BFS2(FirstSend(X,n,m) ∧ Receive(Y,m′)
∧Contains(n,m′)
⇒ Send(X,m) < Receive(Y,m′)).
FS2 is sound for a protocol Q if it is nonce-preserving, which is the case if every
program in Q satisfies the following two (syntactic) conditions:
1. Fresh nonces (nonces not sent out on the network) should not be contained
in the input to the verify action.
2. Once a message containing a fresh nonce has been signed, no further mes-
sages are signed by the program until that message is sent on the network.
As with VER, FS2 is sound only if the bound FS2 is chosen appropriately.
The appropriate choice of bound is closely related to prgP , the security bound
of the pseudorandom-number generator P specified by protocol Q. We define
FS2 as follows:
FS2(η, tb, ~n) = 
prg
P (η, tb+ δ, qn) + η × q × 2−η,
where qn is the total number of new actions on a trace, q = n/η ∗ qr is an upper
bound on the number of nonces that the adversary can send to a protocol thread
on a receive, n is the length of the longest message that can be received, qr is
the number of receive actions in a trace, and δ is the reduction overhead for the
axiom and can be bounded by a polynomial that is O(qrη2).8
Proof rule for protocol invariants To give the proof rules for invariants,
we need a little notation. IS(Q) (read as the initial segments of Q) denotes the
set of all prefixes of each of the roles in Q. Since, a protocol is composed of only
a finite number of roles, the proof rule has only a finite number of antecedents.
HON.
∆ `Q ∀I.(Start(I)⇒ ϕ)
∀P ∈ IS(Q). ∆ `Q ∀I.(Start(I)[P ]Iϕ)
∆ `Q ϕ
Informally, this rule states that if a property ϕ holds at the beginning of a trace
and is preserved by every protocol program, then ϕ holds at the end of a trace.
Proof rules for modal formulas We have the following rule and axiom for
reasoning about modal formulas:
PC↑.
∆ ` Bϕ
∆ ` B(θ[P ]Iϕ)
PC⇒. ∆ ` ((θ[P ]X(ϕ⇒ ψ)) ∧ (θ[P ]Xϕ))⇒ (θ[P ]Xψ).
8Similar to the above, the concrete reduction for FS2 is given in Algorithm 2 in Section 5.4.
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The variant of PC↑ that does not mention belief—from ϕ infer θ[P ]Iϕ—is
also sound and, indeed, can be derived from PC↑ and the rules for reasoning
about beliefs given below. We seem to need the stronger version to prove results
about protocols of interest. We remark that the axiom (B1(θ[P ]I(ϕ ⇒ ψ)) ∧
B2(θ[P ]Iϕ)) ⇒ B1+2(θ[P ]Iψ), which we actually use in our proof, can be
derived easily from PC⇒ and the axioms for belief given below.
We have the following rules for Hoare-Style reasoning:
G1.
∆ ` θ[P ]Xϕ1 ∆ ` θ[P ]Xϕ2
∆ ` θ[P ]Xϕ1 ∧ ϕ2
.
G2.
∆ ` θ1[P ]Xϕ ∆ ` θ2[P ]Xϕ
∆ ` θ1 ∨ θ2[P ]Xϕ
.
G3.
∆ ` θ ⇒ θ′ ∆ ` θ′[P ]Xϕ′ ∆ ` ϕ′ ⇒ ϕ
∆ ` θ[P ]Xϕ
.
We also have the following rule for sequential composition:
S1.
∆ ` ϕ1[P ]Xϕ2 ∆ ` ϕ2[P ′]Xϕ3
∆ ` ϕ1[PP ′]Xϕ3
.
First-order reasoning about beliefs Our proof system includes a complete
proof system for first-order belief logic that allows us to prove formulas of the
form Bϕ assuming a set of formulas of the form B
′
ψ. The axioms and inference
rules are just specializations of more general axioms and rules given by Halpern
[1]. Here is (a slightly simplified version of) the proof system9:
B1.
∆ ` ϕ⇒ ϕ′
∆ ` Bϕ⇒ Bϕ′ .
B2. ∆ ` B0(true)
B3. ∆ ` Bϕ ∧B′ϕ′ ⇒ B+′(ϕ ∧ ϕ′)
The next axiom is sound in our setting, where all traces get positive proba-
bility. This means if ϕ holds with probability 1, then it must hold on all traces,
since no trace has probability 0.
B4. ∆ ` B0(ϕ)⇒ ϕ.
We include all first order tautologies as axioms in our proof system.
5.4 Soundness
We now state our soundness theorem. `Q ψ denotes that ψ is provable using
instances of the axiom and proof rule schemas for protocol Q (that is, all rules
of the form `Q . . . or ` . . .).
Theorem 1. (Soundness) If `Q ψ then ∆ |=Q ψ.
9The more general versions of axioms B1-3 are presented in Appendix A.3
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We first present definitions and lemmas required to prove the soundness
of QPCL’s proofsystem, and then prove the soundness of the axioms about
cryptographic primitives as illustrative cases. Appendix A.1 contains proofs of
other axioms.
Each property that is provable using QPCL’s proof system is a safety prop-
erty in the following sense.
Definition 2. A basic formula ϕ is called a safety property if L, V 6|= ϕ implies
that for all traces L′ such that L  L′, L′, V and 6|= ϕ.
Safety ensures that properties which are false on a trace continue to be false.
This allows us the bound the probability of a formula being false in the middle
of an execution, by the probability at the end of the execution.
Since safety applies only to trace properties and not to formulas with belief
operators, we convert probabilistic assertions to basic formulas using an erasure
operation (·)◦.
Definition 3 (Erasure). The erasure operation (ψ)◦ is defined by induction on
ψ as follows:
• (B(ϕ))◦ = ϕ.
• (ψ1 ∧ ψ2)◦ = (ψ1)◦ ∧ (ψ2)◦.
• (¬ψ)◦ = ¬(ψ)◦.
• (∀x.ψ)◦ = ∀x.(ψ)◦.
• (ϕ)◦ = ϕ.
Lemma 1 (Safety). If `Q ψ, then (ψ)◦ is a safety property.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of `Q ψ. We consider three cases here,
and leave the remaining cases to the reader:
B1. Assume by the induction hypothesis that ϕ⇒ ϕ′ is a safety property. Then
it is immediate that (B(ϕ)⇒ B(ϕ′))◦ is a safety property.
PC↑. Assuming, by the induction hypothesis, that ϕ is a safety property, we
must show that θ[P ]Iϕ is a safety property. Assume that for some L, V ,
it is the case that L, V 6|= θ[P ]Iϕ. By the semantics of the modal formula,
we know that there exists L1, L2, V ′ such that (L, V  [P ]I |L1,L2, V ′),
L1, V |= θ, and L2, V ′ 6|= ϕ. For all traces L′ such that L  L′, we must
have that L′, V  [P ]I |L1,L2, V ′. Therefore, L′, V 6|= θ[P ]Iϕ.
FS2. We need to show that ϕFS2 = FirstSend(X,n,m) ∧ Receive(Y,m′) ⇒
Send(X,m) < Receive(Y,m′) is a safety property. Assume that for some
trace L, V , it is the case that L, V 6|= ϕFS2. Therefore, it must be the
case that (Vˆ (Y ), receive, Vˆ (m′)) ∈ L and that (Vˆ (X), sent Vˆ (m), 〈〉)
does not appear in L before (Vˆ (Y ), receive, Vˆ (m′)) ∈ L. Therefore, the
same must be true for all L′ such that L  L′.
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Soundness of the axioms about cryptographic primitives We prove
axioms about cryptographic primitives sound by reducing the validity of the
axiom to the security of the primitive. Such proofs require augmenting the
implementations of primitives with a program that monitors the validity of
the axiom on the trace. When a violation of the axiom is detected, it can be
transformed into a violation of the primitive’s security. As every attack on the
axiom can be transformed in to an attack on the primitive, the probability of
the primitive being broken is a bound on the probability that the axiom is false.
However, we need to account for the additional time required to monitor the
validity of the axiom while computing the probability of attack on the primitive.
In order to prove the soundness of VER, we need to provide a formal defi-
nition of execution tree, so that we can do an induction on the structure of the
execution tree.
We define a prefix relation on trees. Intuitively, a tree B is a prefix of B′ if
every trace in B is a prefix of B′.
Definition 4 (Tree Prefix). A tree B is a prefix of B′, denoted B  B′, if one
of the following conditions hold:
1. B = B′,
2. B is a configuration C and B′ = (C → B1 | · · · | C → Bk)10,
3. B = (C → B1 | · · · | C → Bk), B′ = (C → B′1 | · · · | C → B′k), and
B1  B′1 · · · Bk  B′k.
We now present an equivalent definition of the probability of a formula in-
terpreted on a tree. The function Pr(ϕ,L,B, V ) denotes the probability of a
formula ϕ in the subtree B that follows after trace L, with valuations V . Figure
3 shows a trace L followed by a subtree BL of B. Since QPCL formulas depend
on an entire trace, it is not enough to define the probability of a formula with
respect to a subtree, but to include the history of events that ocurred before
the subtree as illustrated in Figure 3. In the definitions below, L → C denotes
the the trace obtained by extending L with the transition C′ → C, where C′ is
the last configuration in L. The empty trace is denoted by ·, and · → C is the
trace C, containing only a single configuration and no transitions.
Definition 5 (Probability). Pr(ϕ,L,B, V ) is defined inductively on B as fol-
lows:
1. Pr(ϕ,L, C, V ) = 1 if L → C, V |= ϕ,
2. Pr(ϕ,L, C, V ) = 0 if L → C, V 6|= ϕ,
3. Pr(ϕ,L,B, V ) = ∑ki=0 pk Pr(ϕ,L → C,Bi, V ) if B = (C p1,c1−−−→ B1 | · · · | C pk,ck−−−→
Bk).
10 Cost and probability labels are elided here for brevity.
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BL
B
L
Figure 3: An Execution Tree with a trace L and subtree BL
The probability of a formula ϕ interpreted on a tree B preceded by the empty
trace, and using valuation V is Pr(ϕ, ·,B, V ). The following lemma states that
the two definitions of probability are equivalent.
Lemma 2. For all valuations V , p
(
[[ϕ]]V (B)) = Pr(ϕ, ·,B, V ).
We also state a lemma that relates the probability of a safety property on a
tree B to its probability on a prefix of B.
Lemma 3. If ϕ is a safety property and B  B′, then for all V , p ([[ϕ]]V (B)) ≥
p
(
[[ϕ]]V (B′)).
In our proofs of the soundness of the axioms about cryptographic primitives,
we replace the implementations of some actions with different implementations
that preserve input-output behavior, in a sense made precise by the following
definition.
Definition 6 (Simulation). An implementation A¯ simulates an implementa-
tion A with the relation ∼ on SA × SA¯ (where SB denotes the set of states
of implementation B), if (a) σinitA ∼ σinitA¯ , where σinitA and σinitA¯ are the ini-
tial states of A and A¯ respectively and (b) if σA ∼ σA¯, then for all transitions
σA, A(t)
c7−→
p
σ′A, ra of A, there exists a transition σA¯, A¯(t)
c′7−→
p
σ ′¯
A
, ra of A¯ such
that σ′A ∼ σ ′¯A. If there exists a b such that, for all transitions of A, if c is the
cost of the transition and c′ is the cost of the corresponding transitions of A¯, we
have c ≤ c′ ≤ c+ b, then A¯ simulates A with time bound b.
Intuitively, if A¯ simulates A with the relation ∼, then starting from ∼-related
states, the implementations A and A¯ exhibit the same input-output behavior,
but have possibly different costs.
We wish to lift simulations over action implementations to simulations over
setups, which are collections of action implementations. However, for a setup
S ′ to simulate S, it is not sufficient for the corresponding implementations in S ′
and S to be simulations. Recall that different implementations may share state,
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and that state sharing is governed by the label
∼
aI of an action a in the thread
with identifier I in the global state. Therefore, we require implementations that
share state to respect each other’s simulation relations.
Definition 7 (Setup Simulation). A setup S ′ simulates a setup S if there exists
a set {∼h1 , · · · ,∼hn} of relations, indexed by global state labels {h1, · · · , hn},
and each 〈〈a〉〉I in S ′ simulates the corresponding implementation in S with
relation ∼h, where h = ∼aI .
We now show that if two setups S and S ′ differ only in their action imple-
mentations, and the action implementations in S ′ simulate the corresponding
implementations in S, then for any safety property ϕ, and assignment V , the
probability of ϕ in the tree generated by S is bounded by the probability of ϕ
in the tree generated by S ′.
Lemma 4. If setup S ′ simulates setup S, each implementation 〈〈a〉〉I in S ′ sim-
ulates the corresponding implementation in S with time bound baI , and ϕ is a
safety property, then for all V , p
(
[[ϕ]]V (T (S, t, ~n, tb, η))) ≥ p ([[ϕ]]V (T (S ′, t, ~n, tb+ ΣaInaI baI , η))),
where naI is the number of times implementation aI is called.
Proof. We first show by induction on T (S, t, ~n, tb, η) that T (S, t, ~n, tb, η) 
T (S ′, t, ~n, tb+ ΣaInaI baI , η). Essentially, we can show that each trace using
the implementations in S ′ makes transitions identical to the trace using the
implementations in S, and takes no more time than the extra time allotted
(ΣaInaI baI ). We then apply Lemma 3.
In the theorem above, we call the extra time allocated for the simulation to
execute (ΣaInaI baI ) the reduction overhead.
Lemma 5. The inference rule VER is sound.
Proof. Let ϕVER abbreviate the formula Verify(Y, s,m, Bˆ)⇒ ∃ι.Sign(〈Bˆ, ι〉, s,m).
We must show that |=Q BVERϕ, where VER is defined as follows:
VER(η, tb, ~n) = 
uf-cma
S (η, tb+ δ, q),
where, uf-cmaS is the concrete security bound of the signature scheme S specified
by the protocol Q, q = Σki=1 (ni× qi) is a bound on the total number of signing
actions on a trace, ni is the number of instances of Ri in Q, qi is the number
of signing actions in role Ri, and δ is the reduction overhead for the simulation
where the implementations of actions sign and verify are replaced respectively
by the implementations sign′ and verify′ described in Algorithm 1.
Given A, η, tb, ~n, and V , we want to show that
p
(
[[¬ϕVER]]V (TQ,A(~n, tb, η))
) ≤ VER(η, tb, ~n).
As a first step, we replace the implementations of sign and verify in Q with
the implementations shown in Algorithm 1. The implementation sign′ keeps
track of the messages signed; verify′ checks whether a verified message has
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ALGORITHM 1: Implementations sign′ and verify′ augment sign and verify to
monitor VER
Implementation sign’((σ,M), (m, k))
1 (σ′, r)← sign(σ, (m, k));
2 return (σ′,M ∪ {m}), r;
Implementation verify’((σ,M), (m, s, k))
1 (σ′, r)← verify(σ, (m, s, k));
2 bad← (m 6∈M) ∧ (r 6= abort);
3 return (σ′,M), r;
been signed before. The variable bad in verify′ is set to true when a message is
verified that has not been signed before. Therefore, bad is set to true precisely
when ¬ϕVER is true on a trace. Note that the implementations sign′ and
verify′ simulate sign and verify. The simulation relation is σ ∼ (σ,M) for
all σ and M , and the initial state for sign′ and verify′ is (σinit, ∅), where σinit
is the initial state for the implementation of sign and verify. Therefore, by
Lemma 4, we have that
p
(
[[¬ϕVER]]V (TQ,A(~n, tb, η))
) ≤ p ([[¬ϕVER]]V (TQ′,A(~n, tb+ δ, η))) .
Let Q′ be the protocol that results by replacing the implementations sign and
verify in Q with sign′ and verify′. Let δ be the additional runtime required
for the reduction in Algorithm 1; δ can be bounded by a polynomial that is
O((qi + qj)
2η), where qi and qj are the number of signature and verification
actions in a role, assuming some quadratic implementation for the set operations
in Algorithm 1. Recall from Section 2 that the uf-cma security condition is
violated when the adversary is able to create a signature of a message that has
not been signed before. Therefore, when bad is set to true, the uf-cma security
of the scheme S has been violated. Consequently, the probability that bad is set
to true can be bounded by uf-cmaS (tb+ δ, q, η), where q is the number of signing
actions and is bounded by the number of signing operations possible in running
the protocol, that is, q = Σki=1 (ni × qi) and qi is the number of signing actions
in role ρi of protocol Q = r1, . . . , rk. Since bad is set to true when ¬ϕVER is
true on a trace, we can show that
p
(
[[¬ϕVER]]V (TQ′,A(~n, tb+ δ, η))
) ≤ uf-cmaS (tb+ δ, q, η) = VER(η, tb, ~n).
Lemma 6. The axiom FS2 is sound.
Proof. Let ϕFS2 abbreviate FirstSend(X,n,m)∧Receive(Y,m′)∧Contains(n,m′)⇒
Send(X,m) < Receive(Y,m′). We must show that |=Q BFS2ϕFS2, where FS2
is defined as follows:
FS2(η, tb, ~n) = 
prg
P (η, tb+ δ, qn) + η × q × 2−η,
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where qn is the total number of new actions on a trace, q = l/η ∗ qr is an upper
bound on the number of nonces that the adversary can send to a protocol thread
on a receive, l is the length of the longest message that can be received, qr is
the number of new, send, and receive actions in a trace, and δ is the reduction
overhead for the simulation where the implementations of actions new, send
and receive are replaced respectively by the implementations new′, send′ and
receive′ described in Algorithm 2.
ALGORITHM 2: Implementations new′, send′, and recv′ augment new, send and
recv repectively to monitor FS2
Implementation new’((σ,M), ())
1 (σ′, ret(n))← new(σ, ());
2 return (σ′,M ∪ {n}), ret(n);
Implementation send’((σ,M), (m, k))
1 (σ′, r)← send(σ, (m, k));
2 return (σ′,M − nonces(m)), r;
Implementation recv’((σ,M), ())
1 (σ′, r)← recv(σ, ());
2 if r = ret(m) then bad← ∃n ∈ nonces(m) ∧ n ∈M ;
3 return (σ′,M), r;
Given A, η, tb, and ~n, we must show that
p
(
[[¬ϕFS2]]V (TQ,A(~n, tb, η))
) ≤ FS2(η, tb, ~n).
Let Q′ be the protocol that results from replacing the implementations of new,
send, and receive with the implementations shown in Algorithm 2. The set
M records the nonces that have been generated but not been sent out. The
implementation new′ records the nonces that have been generated. When a
message is sent with a nonce using send′, it is removed from M . The variable
bad is set to true when there is a nonce inM that has been received. Essentially,
bad is set to true on a trace exactly when ϕFS2 is false.
Consider the following two experiments:
• ExpRandom: Run protocolQ′, with new implemented by a random-number
generator with uniformly random distibution. If bad is set to true output
1 else 0.
• ExpP : Run protocol Q′, with new implemented by the pseudorandom-
number generator P specified by the protocol. If bad is set to true output
1 else 0.
Recall from Section 2 that the probability of an adversary being able to dis-
tinguish a uniform random number generator from the output of a pseudorandom-
number generator S after seeing q samples and in time t is bounded by prgP (η, t, q).
Therefore, we have the following:
Pr(ExpP = 1)−Pr(ExpRandom = 1) ≤ prgP (η, tb+ δ, q),
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where qn = Σki=1 (ni × qi), where qi is the number of new actions in role i
and ni is the number of instances of role ri in protocol roles {r1, · · · , rk}. The
additional runtime δ can be bounded by a polynomial that is O(q2rη), where qr
is the total number of new, send, and receive actions in the protocol, assuming
some quadratic implementation of the set operations in Algorithm 2. The total
runtime for prg is tb+ δ to account for the additional runtime for the reduction.
As bad is set to true exactly when ¬ϕFS2 is true, as with the proof for VER,
we can use Lemma 4 to get the following bound for ϕFS2:
p
(
[[¬ϕFS2]]V TQ,A(~n, tb, η)
) ≤ Pr(ExpP (A) = 1).
We now only need to derive a bound forPr(ExpRandom = 1), sincePr(ExpP =
1) ≤ Pr(ExpRandom(A) = 1) + prg(η, tb + δ, q). When we use a true random
number generator, at each guess, the adversary can guess the random number
generated with probability only 2−η. Therefore, if the adversary has q guesses,
by the union bound, we can show that the total probability of bad being true is
q2−η. The adversary can attempt to guess the nonce at each receive action.
However, each message received can contain multiple nonces. If the longest
message in the protocol is of length l, then each message received can contain at
most l/η nonces of length η, and so a bound on q, the total number of guesses
available to the adversary, is qrl/η. Finally, we have that
Pr(ExpRandom = 1) ≤ qrl
η2η
.
Therefore, we have that
p
(
[[¬ϕFS2]]V TQ,A(~n, tb, η)
) ≤ Pr(ExpP = 1) ≤ prg(η, tb+δ, q)+ qrl
η2η
= FS2(η, tb, ~n).
6 Proof Outline for the Example Protocol
A formal proof of the weak authentication property for the initiator guaranteed
by executing the CR protocol is presented in Appendix A.2. We explain below
the outline of the proof and discuss how the axioms and rules described in the
previous section are used. The formal proof proceeds roughly as follows.
First, we assert what actions were executed by the thread with identifier A
in the initiator role. Specifically, in this part of the proof, we prove that A has
received and verified Bˆ’s signature. We then use the fact that the signatures
of honest parties are unforgeable (axiom VER) and first-order reasoning about
beliefs to conclude that some thread with name ι of Bˆ (B = 〈Bˆ, ι〉 below) must
have produced this signature. This step introduces a bound of VER, and we
obtain the following formula:
Honest(Bˆ) `Q BVER(true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A Sign(B, s, 〈“Resp”, y,m, Aˆ〉)). (2)
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Second, we use the honesty rule HON to infer that whenever any thread
(and by instantiation using the rules of first-order belief logic, any the thread
with identifier B of agent Bˆ) generates a signature of this form, he must have
previously received the first message from Aˆ and then sent the second message;
moreover, the second message was in fact the first send involving the random
nonce y:
`Q B0(Sign(B, s, 〈“Resp”, y,m, Aˆ〉)⇒ (Receive(B,m)
∧ (Send(B, 〈y, s〉)⇒
Receive(B,m) < Send(B, 〈y, s〉))
∧ FirstSend(B, 〈y, s〉))).
(3)
Combining (2) and (3) using rules for first-order reasoning about beliefs, we
conclude that the following formula, which orders the actions performed by B,
holds:
`Q BVER(true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A
Receive(B,m) < Send(B, 〈y, s〉)). (4)
Next we want to prove that B received the first message after A sent it. We
use the fact that since the thread with identifier A generated the random nonce
m and sent it out for the first time in the first message of the protocol, then if
the thread with identifier B received a message from which m is computable, he
must have done so after A sent out the first message. This step uses the FS2
axiom, and therefore the bound associated with the underlying PRG applies:
`Q BFS2(true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A
((FirstSend(A,m,m) ∧ Receive(B,m) ∧ Contains(m,m))
⇒ Send(A,m) < Receive(B,m))).
(5)
Using the fact that A’s first send had the form in the premise of the impli-
cation in (5) and that B received the corresponding message from (3), from B3,
(4), and (5), we infer desired ordering of actions by A and B. Note that since
two belief formulas are combined, the bounds add up:
Honest(Bˆ) `Q BVER+FS2(true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A
Send(A,m) < Receive(B,m)).
The rest of the proof uses similar ideas (including another application of
FS2) to order other actions performed by threads A and B to prove a matching-
conversation like property of the protocol with a bound that is tightly related
to the security of the underlying digital signature scheme and pseudorandom-
number generator:
Honest(Bˆ) `Q BVER+2·FS2(true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A ∃ι.
Send(A,m) < Receive(B,m)∧
Receive(B,m) < Send(B, 〈y, s〉)∧
Send(B, 〈y, s〉) < Receive(A, 〈y, s〉)),
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where B = 〈Bˆ, ι〉. The bound on the security guarantee is,  = VER + 2FS2.
Therefore (η, tb, ~n) = uf-cmaS (η, tb+δs, q)+2·n/η·qr ·2−η+2prgP (η, tb+δp, q′) and
S, P are respectively the signature scheme and pseudorandom-number generator
for protocol Q. The quantities δs and δp are the respective runtime overheads
for the proofs of the VER and FS2 axioms. These are small polynomials and
are described in 5.4. Note that each role uses just one signature action. Hence q
in (2) is upper bounded by ninit + nresp, where ninit and nresp are the number
of instances of the initiator and responder roles respectively. Each role uses
just one random number generation action. Hence, q′ is upper bounded by
ninit + nresp.
7 Related Work
We discuss (1) formal techniques for proving concrete security, and (2) formal
techniques asymptotic security in computational models.
7.1 Formal Concrete Security
Prior work on formal methods for concrete security proofs is largely based on
reasoning about program equivalence. This approach operates at the same level
of abstraction as traditional proofs in cryptography, where security is proved
via a sequence of games, all of which are equivalent up to a small probability.
Techniques to prove equivalence of probabilistic programs have been used to for-
malize cryptographic reduction proofs. Tools for assisting development of such
proofs are CryptoVerif [7], CertiCrypt [8], and EasyCrypt [9]. ZooCrypt [13]
contains a formal system for computing the concrete bounds of padding-based
encryption primitives. In contrast, relational reasoning in QPCL is not exposed
to the users of the proof system, and is pushed down to the soundness proofs
of axioms related to cryptography. An interesting direction to pursue would be
to mechanize the soundness proofs of QPCL’s axioms using such a framework.
7.2 Formal Asymptotic Security
While formal techniques for concrete security proofs of cryptography are a rela-
tively new development, a number of approaches have been proposed for deriving
proofs of security in asymptotic models, where it is shown that the probabil-
ity with which a probabilistic polynomial time adversary can break a scheme
is a negligible function of the security parameter. We discuss some of these
approaches here.
The closest strand of related work to ours include first-order logics such as
the computational extensions of PCL [3, 4] and the logic of Bana and Comon-
Lundh [14] (CCSA). QPCL borrows heavily from PCL’s syntax and reasoning
style, which allows for the specification of precise temporal properties and in-
variants of programs such as the matching-conversations property proved in
this paper. This is an important point of difference from CCSA [14], where the
33
specification language expresses relations between terms appearing in protocol,
such as whether one term can be derived from another. An appealing feature
of CCSA is that it is designed to be unconditionally sound, in the sense that
all assumptions about primitives are encoded in the logic itself. An interesting
direction to pursue would be to adapt their unconditionally sound approach to
QPCL, while retaining the richness of our specification language.
Symbolic models have been successful in proving the security of a large
number protocols, assuming perfect cryptography. In the so-called Dolev-Yao
model [15], an attacker’s capabilities are defined by a symbolic abstraction of
cryptographic primitives. The security of a protocol in a Dolev-Yao model
does not, in general, imply security under standard cryptographic assumptions.
To justify reasoning with symbolic models, a research direction initiated by
Abadi and Rogaway [16] investigates the conditions under which security in the
symbolic model implies security in the computational model. These results (e.g.,
[17, 18, 19, 20, 21]), referred to as computational soundness proofs, typically
show that under certain conditions a computational attacker can be translated
to a symbolic attacker with high probability. Reasoning about cryptography
in a symbolic model has been shown to be helpful for automating proofs of
protocols [22, 23]. Computational soundness theorems are very strong general
results that prove through complicated reductions that any program secure in
a particular symbolic model will be asyptotically secure. We conjecture that it
is because of the generality of these results that these reductions have not been
shown to yield precise concrete bounds for most cryptographic schemes.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we present Quantitative Protocol Composition Logic (QPCL), a
program logic for reasoning about concrete security bounds of of cryptographic
protocols. QPCL supports reasoning about temporal trace properties, Hoare
logic-style invariants and postconditions of protocol programs, and first-order
belief assertions. The semantics and soundness proofs of QPCL depend on a for-
mal probabilistic programming model that describes the concurrent execution of
protocol programs with a computationally bounded adversary, while accounting
for exact runtimes and probabilities. As an illustrative example, we use QPCL
to prove an authentication property with concrete bounds of a challeng-response
protocol.
In future work, we hope to extend QPCL to support reasoning about non-
trace properties, such as secrecy based on computational indistinguishability,
and to cover additional cryptographic primitives (e.g., symmetric and public
key encryption, hash functions, and message authentication codes). Because of
the correspondence between QPCL presented here and earlier versions of PCL,
for which we have proofs for deployed protocols such as SSL and Kerberos,
we believe it should be possible to develop exact security analyses for such
protocols.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof System and Soundness Proofs
In this section, we prove the soundness of the axioms that we discussed in the
main text.
Lemma 7. The axiom PC↑ is sound.
Proof. Fix a protocol Q, and suppose that |=Q Bϕ. We must show that
|=Q B (ψ[P ]Iϕ). Given an adversary A, security parameter η, time bound
tb, instance vector ~n, and assigment V , let B = TQ,A(η, tb, ~n). Since |=Q Bϕ,
we must have p
(
[[¬ϕ]]V (B)) ≤ (η, tb, ~n).
Let B1 = [[¬(ψ[P ]Iϕ)]]V (B) = {L ∈ B | ∃L1,L2, V ′.(L, V  [P ]I |L1,L2, V ),L1, V |=
θ, and L2, V ′ 6|= ϕ}. We can assume without loss of generality that the free
variables in ϕ are not bound by [P ]I , since this can be ensured via renam-
ing. We can also show by the definition of matching that V (x) = V ′(x) for all
variables x that are not bound by [P ]I . Therefore, we have that B1 = {L ∈
B | ∃L1,L2, V ′.(L, V  [P ]I |L1,L2, V ),L1, V |= θ, and L2, V 6|= ϕ}. Addi-
tionally, we know using Lemma 1 that ϕ is a safety property. Also, by the
definition of matching, we know that if (L, V  [P ]I |L1,L2, V ), then L2 ⊆ L,
and consequently, L2, V 6|= ϕ implies L, V 6|= ϕ. Therefore, we can show that:
p (B1) = p ({L ∈ B | ∃L1,L2, V ′.(L  [P ]I |L1,L2, V ′),L1, V |= θ, and L2, V 6|= ϕ})
≤ p ({L ∈ B | ∃L1,L2, V ′.(L  [P ]I |L1,L2, V ′),L1, V |= θ, and L, V 6|= ϕ})
≤ p ({L ∈ B | L, V 6|= ϕ})
= p
(
[[¬ϕ]]V (B))
≤ (η, tb, ~n).
Therefore, p
(
[[¬(ψ[P ]Iϕ)]]V (B)
)
= p (B1) ≤ (η, tb, ~n), and |=Q B (ψ[P ]Iϕ), as
desired.
Lemma 8. The axiom PC⇒ is sound.
Proof. We want to show that |=Q (θ[P ]I(ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2)) ∧ (θ[P ]Iϕ1))⇒ (θ[P ]Iϕ2).
Given A, η, tb, ~n, V , let B = TQ,A(η, tb, ~n). Fix a trace L ∈ B. Suppose that
L, V |= θ[P ]I(ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2) and L, V |= θ[P ]Iϕ1. We must show that L, V |=
θ[P ]Iϕ2. Fix L1, L2 and V ′ such that L, V  [P ]I |L1,L2, V ′ and L1, V |= θ.
We must show that L2, V ′ |= ϕ2. This is immediate since it must be the case
that L2, V ′ |= ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2 and L2, V ′ |= ϕ1.
Lemma 9. The axiom PC∧ is sound.
Proof. This proof is analogous to the previous proof.
Before proving the soundness of inference rule HON, we state three lemmas
asserting that the validity of a simple formula ϕ on a trace is not affected if
the trace is extended with a transition in which in an action is not executed,
that is, the configuration transition is due to one of the rules abort,wait, or
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switch. These can be proved by a straightforward induction on the structure of
the formula ϕ.
Lemma 10. If trace L ends in configuration C, C → C′ (abort) and L
′ is the
extension of L with C′, then L, V |= ϕ implies L′, V |= ϕ.
Lemma 11. If trace L ends in configuration C, C → C′ (wait) and L
′ is the
extension of L with C′, then L, V |= ϕ implies L′, V |= ϕ.
Lemma 12. If trace L ends in configuration C, C → C′ (switch) and L
′ is the
extension of L with C′, then L, V |= ϕ implies L′, V |= ϕ.
Lemma 13. The inference rule HON is sound.
Proof. Suppose that |=Q Start(I)⇒ ϕ and |=Q ϕ[P ]Iϕ for all thread-identifiers
I and all roles P ∈ IS(Q). We must show that |=Q ϕ. Fix Q,A, η, tb, ~n, V , and
let T = TQ,A(η, tb, ~n). Consider a trace L ∈ T , a valuation V , and a thread-
identifier I. We show that L, V |= ϕ by induction on the number of transitions
in L.
For the base case, suppose that L has no transitions (it is an empty trace
or has single configuration C), then L, V |= Start(I). Since |=Q Start(I)⇒ ϕ, it
follows that L, V |= ϕ, as desired.
If L has at least one transition, then there exists some trace L′ ending with
a configuration C such that L is L′ extended with the transition C → C′. By the
induction hypothesis, we have that L′ |= ϕ. We now have the following cases
for C → C′:
• (act) In this case, C → C′ is an action transition. Since traces are generated
by executing the actions of protocol programs in order, it can be shown
that L, V  [P ]I |L1,L, V ′, for some P ∈ IS(Q), and some L1 ≺ L. By the
induction hypothesis, we know that L1, V |= ϕ. Also, by the antecedent,
we know that L, V |= ϕ[P ]Iϕ. Therefore, L, V ′ |= ϕ. We can assume
without loss of generality that the free variables in ϕ are not bound by
[P ]I , since this can be ensured via renaming. We can also show by the
definition of matching that V (x) = V ′(x) for all variables x that are not
bound by [P ]I . Therefore, we have that L, V |= ϕ.
• (abort) By Lemma 10, L, V |= ϕ.
• (wait) By Lemma 11, L, V |= ϕ.
• (switch) By Lemma 12, L, V |= ϕ.
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Additional axioms In the main text, we did not give axioms for Contains,
Fresh or equality. We now give these axioms. The proof of soundness for each
of these axioms is straightforward, and is left to the reader. Axioms COMP1-
COMP7 capture computability, and NCOMP captures non-computability.
Axioms FS1-FS5 capture freshness of nonces. Axioms EQ1 and EQ2 capture
equality.
COMP1. B0 (Contains(m,m))
COMP2. B0 (Contains(x, y) ∧ Contains(y, z)⇒ Contains(x, z))
COMP3. B0 (Contains(n,m0)⇒ Contains(n, 〈m0,m1〉))
COMP4. B0 (Contains(n,m1)⇒ Contains(n, 〈m0,m1〉)
COMP5. B0 (Contains(x, y) [P ]I Contains(x, y))
COMP6. B0 (true [m′ ← sign m, k]I Contains(m,m′))
COMP7. B0 (true [_← verify m′,m, k]I Contains(m′,m))
NCOMP. If m and m′ are atomic and m 6= m′, then B0 (¬Contains(m,m′)).
FS1. B0 (true [n← new]I Fresh(I, n))
FS3. B0 (Fresh(I, n) [nosendactions]IFresh(I, n))
FS4. B0 (Fresh(I, n) [send m]I¬Contains(n,m)⇒ Fresh(I, n))
FS5. B0 (Fresh(I, n) [send m]IContains(n,m)⇒ FirstSend(I, n,m))
EQ1. 〈t1, · · · , tk〉 = 〈t′1, · · · , t′k〉 ⇒ (t1 = t′1) ∧ · · · ∧ (tk = t′k)
EQ2. ϕ ∧ (x = t)⇒ [t/x]ϕ
Our proofs also use axioms for local reasoning about the temporal ordering of
actions in a program. In these axioms, a, a1, a2 ∈ {send, receive, new, verify}.
AA1. B0 (true[· · ·x← a t; · · · ]Ia(I, x, t))
AA2. B0 (true[· · ·x1 ← a1 t1; · · ·x2 ← a2 t2 · · · ]I(a1(I, x1, t1) < a2(I, x2, t2)))
AA3. a1(I, x1, t1) < a2(I, x2, t2)⇒ a1(I, x1, t1)
AA4. a1(I, x1, t1) < a2(I, x2, t2)⇒ a2(I, x2, t2)
AA5. If for all V , V (a(I, x, t)) 6= V (a′(I, x′, t′)), then ¬a(I, x, t)[x′ ← a′ t′]I¬a(I, x, t)
AA6. ¬a(I, x, t)[x′ ← a t′]X(a(I, x, t)⇒ (x′ = x) ∧ (t′ = t))
Start. Start(I)⇒ ¬a(I, x, t)
37
Informally, axiomAA1 states that that if a is an action and a is the correspond-
ing action predicate, then after the thread with identifier I executes (x← a t; ),
a(I, x, t) holds. Axiom AA2 establishes an order between actions in a proto-
col program. Axioms AA3 and AA4 state that if we can establish an order
between two actions, both actions must have actually occurred. Axiom AA5
states that if an action predicate does not unify with an action, and if the action
predicate is false before the action, then it is false after the action. Axiom Start
states that no actions with thread identifier I have occurred if Start(I) holds on
a trace.
A.2 Full Proof of Protocol Example
We now provide a full, formal proof of the correctness of the protocol example.
Using AA1,
true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A Verify(A, s, 〈“Resp”, y,m, Aˆ〉, Bˆ)
is provable. Thus, by B1 and B2 so is
B0(true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A Verify(A, s, 〈“Resp”, y,m, Aˆ〉, Bˆ)).
Choose ∆ to be Honest(Bˆ). By VER instantiated to principal Bˆ,
∆ `Q BVER(Verify(A, s, 〈“Resp”, y,m, Aˆ〉, Bˆ)⇒ ∃ι.Sign(〈Bˆ, ι〉, s, 〈“Resp”, y,m, Aˆ〉))
is provable. By PC↑, so is
∆ `Q BVER(true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A(Verify(A, s, 〈“Resp”, y,m, Aˆ〉, Bˆ)⇒ ∃ι.Sign(〈Bˆ, ι〉, s, 〈“Resp”, y,m, Aˆ〉))).
By PC⇒, so is
BVER(true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A ∃ι.Sign(〈Bˆ, ι〉, s, 〈“Resp”, y,m, Aˆ〉)).
Let B abbreviate the term 〈Bˆ, ι〉. We have that
BVER(true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A∃ι. Sign(B, s, 〈“Resp”, y,m, Aˆ〉)). (6)
Next, we wish to use the HON rule to prove the following invariant ϕinv about
protocol programs.
ϕinv = Sign(Y, s
′, 〈“Resp”, y′,m′, Xˆ〉)⇒ Receive(Y,m′)∧FirstSend(Y, y′, 〈y′, s′〉)∧Φ′)
where
Φ′ ≡ Send(Y, 〈y′, s′〉)⇒ Receive(Y,m′) < Send(Y, 〈y′, s′〉).
Therefore, we need to show that Start(X)⇒ ϕinv, and for all initial segments
P of protocol roles ϕinv[P ]Xϕinv. By axiom Start, we have:
Start(Y )⇒ ¬Sign(Y, s′, 〈“Resp”, y′,m′, Xˆ〉). (7)
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And therefore, by straightforward first order reasoning,
Start(Y )⇒ ϕinv. (8)
We need to show for every initial segment P of the roles of the protocol,
Start(Y )[P ]Y ϕinv. We show this for three interesting cases.
We first consider the initial segment P1 = 〈x, Xˆ〉 ← receive. Using AA5,
we have:
¬Sign(Y, r, 〈“Resp”, n, x, Xˆ〉)[P1]Y ¬Sign(Y, r, 〈“Resp”, n, x, Xˆ〉). (9)
By straightforward first order reasoning and using Start and G3, we have:
Start(Y )[P1]Y ϕinv. (10)
Next, we consider the initial segment P2 = 〈x, Xˆ〉 ← receive;n← new; r ←
sign〈“Resp”, n, x, Xˆ〉. Using AA1, we have:
true[P2]Y Receive(Y, x). (11)
Weakening using G3, we have:
Start(Y )[P2]Y Receive(Y, x). (12)
Also, using AA5, we have:
¬Send(Y, t′)[P2]Y ¬Send(Y, t′). (13)
Also, by the definition of FirstSend, we can show that:
¬Send(Y, t′)⇒ FirstSend(Y, n, 〈n, r〉). (14)
Therefore, using Start, G3 and (13) we have:
Start(Y )[P2]Y FirstSend(Y, n, 〈n, r〉). (15)
Similarly, we can show that:
Start(Y )[P2]Y ¬Send(Y, 〈r, n〉). (16)
And therefore, by G3,
Start(Y )[P2]Y Send(Y, 〈r, n〉)⇒ Receive(Y, x) < Send(Y, 〈r, n〉). (17)
Therefore, from (13), (15), (17), and using G1, we have:
Start(Y )[P2]Y Receive(Y, x)∧FirstSend(Y, n, 〈n, r〉)∧Send(Y, 〈r, n〉)⇒ Receive(Y, x) < Send(Y, 〈r, n〉).
(18)
Now, using AA5, AA6, and Start, for fresh u we can show that:
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Start(Y )[P2]Y Sign(Y, u)→ u = 〈r, 〈“Resp”, n, x, Xˆ〉〉 (19)
Substituting u with 〈s′, 〈“Resp”, y′,m′, Xˆ〉〉, and using EQ1, we have:
Start(Y )[P2]Y Sign(Y, 〈s′, 〈“Resp”, y′,m′, Xˆ〉〉)⇒ (s′ = r) ∧ (y′ = n) ∧ (m′ = x).
(20)
Applying G1 to 18 and 20, and rearranging terms, we have:
Start(Y )[P2]Y Sign(Y, 〈s′, 〈“Resp”, y′,m′, Xˆ〉〉)⇒
(s′ = r) ∧ (y′ = n) ∧ (m′ = x)
Receive(Y, x) ∧ FirstSend(Y, n, 〈n, r〉) ∧ Send(Y, 〈r, n〉)⇒ Receive(Y, x) < Send(Y, 〈r, n〉).
(21)
Using EQ2 on (21), we have what we wanted to prove.
Start(Y )[P2]Y Sign(Y, 〈s′, 〈“Resp”, y′,m′, Xˆ〉〉)⇒
Receive(Y, x) ∧ FirstSend(Y, s′, 〈y′,m′〉) ∧ Send(Y, 〈y′, s′〉)⇒ Receive(Y,m′) < Send(Y, 〈y′, s′〉).
(22)
Finally, we consider the initial segment P3 = 〈x, Xˆ〉 ← receive;n ←
new; r ← sign〈“Resp”, n, x, Xˆ〉; send〈Xˆ,< n, r >〉.
Similar to (12), we can show that
Start(Y )[P3]Y Receive(Y, x). (23)
Using FS1, we have :
true[n← new]Y Fresh(Y, n). (24)
We can also show using G3 that:
Start(Y )[〈x, Xˆ〉 ← new]Y true. (25)
Therefore, by S1, (24), and (25):
Start(Y )[〈x, Xˆ〉 ← receive;n← new]Y Fresh(Y, n). (26)
By FS3, we have:
Fresh(I, n)[r ← sign〈“Resp”, n, x, Xˆ〉]Fresh(I, n) (27)
Therefore, by S1, (26), and (27):
Start(Y )[P2]Y Fresh(Y, n). (28)
Also, using COMP1 and COMP3, we have:
Contains(n, 〈n, r〉). (29)
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Therefore, using FS5 and (29), we have:
Fresh(Y, n)[send〈n, r〉)]Y FirstSend(Y, n, 〈n, r〉). (30)
Therefore, by S1, (28), and (30):
Start(Y )[P3]Y FirstSend(Y, n, 〈n, r〉). (31)
Also, by AA2, we have:
Start(Y )[P3]Y Receive(Y, x) < Send(Y, 〈r, n〉) (32)
Therefore, we have
Start(Y )[P3]Y Send(Y, 〈r, n〉)⇒ Receive(Y, x) < Send(Y, 〈r, n〉) (33)
Therefore, by G1, (23), (31), and (33).
Start(Y )[P3]Y Receive(Y, x)∧FirstSend(Y, n, 〈n, r〉)∧Send(Y, 〈r, n〉)⇒ Receive(Y, x) < Send(Y, 〈r, n〉).
(34)
Analogously, to proof steps of (18)-(21), we can use 34 to show:
Start(Y )[P3]Y Sign(Y, 〈s′, 〈“Resp”, y′,m′, Xˆ〉〉)⇒
Receive(Y, x) ∧ FirstSend(Y, s′, 〈y′,m′〉) ∧ Send(Y, 〈y′, s′〉)⇒ Receive(Y,m′) < Send(Y, 〈y′, s′〉).
(35)
We can show Start(Y )[P ]Y ϕinv for every initial sequence, and by using
HON, we obtain the following invariant about protocols:
B0(Sign(Y, s′, 〈“Resp”, y′,m′, Xˆ〉)⇒ Receive(Y,m′)∧FirstSend(Y, y′, 〈y′, s′〉)∧Φ′).
(36)
By instantiating some of the free variables in (36) and using axiom B1, we get
that
B0(Sign(B, s, 〈“Resp”, y,m, Aˆ〉)⇒ Receive(B,m) ∧ FirstSend(B, y, 〈y, r〉) ∧ Φ)
is provable, where
Φ ≡ Send(B, 〈y, s〉)⇒ Receive(B,m) < Send(B, 〈y, s〉).
By PC↑,
B0(true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A Sign(B, s, 〈“Resp”, y,m, Aˆ〉)⇒ (Receive(B,m)∧FirstSend(B, y, 〈y, s〉)∧Φ))
is provable. By PC⇒ and (6),
∆ `Q BVER(true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A ∃ι. (Receive(B,m) ∧ FirstSend(B, y, 〈y, s〉) ∧ Φ))
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is provable. By FS1,COMP so is
B0(true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A(FirstSend(A,m,m)∧Contains(m,m)∧Contains(y, 〈y, s〉))).
Therefore by PC∧ and B1, so is
∆ `Q BVER(true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A∃ι. (Receive(B,m) ∧ FirstSend(A,m,m) ∧ Contains(m,m)∧
Receive(A, 〈y, s〉) ∧ FirstSend(B, y, 〈y, s〉) ∧ Contains(y, 〈y, s〉) ∧ Φ)).
(37)
We instantiate FS2 with message m and nonce m, and use this to establish
Send(A,m) < Receive(B,m):
BFS2(FirstSend(A,m,m)∧Receive(B,m)∧Contains(m,m)⇒ Send(A,m) < Receive(B,m))
(38)
Similarly, we instantiate FS2 with message 〈y, s〉 and nonce s. We will use
this to establish Send(B, 〈y, s〉) < Receive(A, 〈y, s〉).
BFS2(FirstSend(B, y, 〈y, s〉)∧Receive(B, 〈y, s〉)∧Contains(y, 〈y, s〉)⇒ Send(B, 〈y, s〉) < Receive(A, 〈y, s〉)).
(39)
Therefore, by the conjunction of (38) and (39) and using B3:
B2·FS2(FirstSend(A,m,m) ∧ Receive(B,m) ∧ Contains(m,m) ∧ FirstSend(B, y, 〈y, s〉)
∧ (Receive(B, 〈y, s〉) ∧ Contains(y, 〈y, s〉)
⇒ Send(A,m) < Receive(B,m)) ∧ Send(B, 〈y, s〉) < Receive(A, 〈y, s〉)).
(40)
Therefore by (37), (40), and using PC↑ and PC⇒,
∆ `Q BVER+2·FS2(true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A∃ι. Send(A,m) < Receive(B,m)∧Send(B, 〈y, s〉) < Receive(A, 〈y, s〉)∧Φ)).
Finally, by AA4 and PC⇒ on Φ,
∆ `Q BVER+2·FS2(true[InitCR(Bˆ)]A∃ι. (Send(A,m) < Receive(B,m)
∧Receive(B,m) < Send(B, 〈y, s〉) ∧ Send(B, 〈y, s〉) < Receive(A, 〈y, s〉))).
A.3 A First-Order Logic of Belief
Halpern [1] presents a “quantitative” variant of first-order conditional logic that
includes formulas whose semantics capture the form of conditional probability
statements that are common in cryptographic security definitions. In this paper,
we use a simplified version of that logic as a foundation, and show how we can
devise an elegant, powerful variant of the logic considered in [3]. We summarize
below the relevant results of [1].
The syntax of (qualitative) first-order conditional logic is straightforward.
Fix a finite first-order vocabulary V consisting, as usual, of function symbols,
predicate symbols, and constants. Starting with atomic formulas of first-order
logic over the vocabulary V, we form more complicated formulas by closing
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off under the standard truth-functional connectives (i.e., ∧ ,∨, ¬, and ⇒), first-
order quantification, and the binary modal operator→. Thus, a typical formula
is ∀x(P (x) → ∃y(Q(x, y) → R(y))). Let LC(V) be the resulting language. We
are most interested in the fragment L0C(V) of LC(V) consisting of all formulas
in LC(V) that have the form ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ϕ→ ψ), where ϕ and ψ are first-order
formulas. (We henceforth omit the V unless it is necessary for clarity.) Note
that in L0C we cannot negate an → formula, nor can we take the conjunction of
two → formulas. As we shall see, the fact that we cannot take the conjunction
is not a real lack of expressive power, since we consider sets of formulas (where a
set can be identified with the conjunction of the formulas in the set). However,
the lack of negation does make for a loss of expressive power.
There are many approaches to giving semantics to first-order conditional
logic (see [24] for an overview). The one most relevant here is what has been
called -semantics [2]. Under this approach, the semantics of formulas in LC(V)
is given with respect to PS structures. A PS structure is a tupleM = (D,W, pi,P),
where D is a domain, W is a set of worlds, pi is an interpretation that asso-
ciates with each predicate symbol (resp., function symbol, constant symbol) in
V and world w ∈ W a predicate (resp., function, domain element) of the right
arity, and P = 〈Pr1,Pr2, . . .〉 is a probability sequence. As usual, a valuation V
associates with each variable x an element V (x) ∈ D.
Given a valuation V , we give semantics to ∧, ¬, ⇒, and ∀ in the standard
way. In particular, we determine whether a first-order formula ϕ is true at a
world w ∈ W as usual. In this case, we write (M,V,w) |= p ϕ. Let [[ϕ]]M,V =
{w : (M,V,w) |= p ϕ}. If ϕ is a closed formula, so that its truth does not
depend on the valuation, we occasionally write [[ϕ]]M rather than [[ϕ]]M,V . We
write (M,V ) |= p ϕ if (M,V,w) |= p ϕ for all worlds w.
The truth of an → formula does not depend on the world, but only on the
PS structure. We can consider two possible semantics for conditional formulas
in PS structures. The first just asks for convergence:
(M,V ) |= p ϕ→ ψ if lim
n→∞Prn([[ψ]]M,V | [[ϕ]]M,V ) = 1,
where Prn([[ψ]]M,V | [[ϕ]]M,V ) is taken to be 1 if Prn([[ϕ]]M,V ) = 0.
The second approach may be of more interest in cryptographic applications,
and asks for super-polynomial convergence. In this approach, we define
(M,V ) |= p ϕ→ ψ if for all k ≥ 1, there exists some nk ≥ 0 such that, for
all n ≥ nk, Prn([[ψ]]M,V | [[ϕ]]M,V ) ≥ 1− (1/nk).11
It turns out that the two appraoches are characterized by the same axiom
system, so we do not distinguish them further here. As usual, we writeM |= p ϕ
if (M,V ) |= p ϕ for all valuations V , and M |= p ϕ if M |= p ϕ for all PS
structures in a setM.
11Note that it follows that if p(n) is a polynomial whose leading coefficient is positive, then
Prn([[ψ]]M,V | [[ϕ]]M,V ) ≥ 1 − (1/p(n)) for sufficiently large n. In [1], this was the condition
used to define the semantics of ϕ→ ψ. The approach used here is simpler, but equivalent.
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In this paper, we need only formulas where the antecedent of → is true. We
take Bϕ (which can be read “ϕ is believed” or “the agent believes ϕ’) to be an
abbreviation of true → ϕ. Roughly speaking, Bϕ holds if the probability of ϕ
approaches 1 faster than any inverse polynomial. Let LBC be the fragment of L0C
where→ occurs only in the context B. As we have seen, such formulas are used
in VER; they are also needed in, for example, the CMA security definition for
digital signatures [25]).
Sound and complete axiomatizations for first-order conditional logic are well
known [26]. Halpern [1] gives a sound and complete axiomatization for L0C .
The advantage of considering this fragment is that it lends itself naturally to
quantitative reasoning. We now review the axiomatization of L0C , show how to
specialize it to LBC , and give the quantitative version of the axioms.
A.4 A Sound and Complete Axiomatization for First-Order
Conditional Logic
To describe the axioms, we define two more languages. Let Lfo be the pure first-
order fragment of LC , consisting of →-free formulas; let L−C be the fragment of
L0C consisting of all formulas of the form ϕ→ ψ where ϕ and ψ are closed first-
order formulas. The axiomatization is based on system PΛ, also known as the
KLM properties [27], restricted to models where all worlds satisfy a particular
first-order theory Λ. The system PΛ applies only to formulas in L−C (so →
formulas cannot be universally quantified); we will need additional axioms to
deal with quantification.
We state the axioms in terms of statements of the form ∆ ↪→ ϕ, where
∆ ⊆ Lfo ∪ L0C and ϕ ∈ L0C . Roughly speaking, ∆ ↪→ ϕ is interpreted as “ϕ
follows from the formulas in ∆”. We write (M,V ) |= p ∆ ↪→ ϕ if (M,V ) |= p ϕ′
for every formula ϕ′ ∈ ∆ implies that (M,V ) |= p ϕ. A collection ∆ of formulas
in L0C can be written as ∆→ ∪∆fo , where ∆→ ⊆ L0C and ∆fo ⊆ Lfo .
We first describe the axioms of PΛ, adapted to this framework. The axioms
all have conclusions of the form ϕ → ψ, since they are intended for reasoning
about L−C . Let `Λ denote provability in first-order logic given the axioms in the
theory Λ. (In describing these axioms, we keep the naming convention used in
[1], which in turn is based on [27], for consistency.)
LLE+. If `Λ∪∆fo ϕ1 ⇔ ϕ2, then from ∆ ↪→ ϕ1 → ψ infer ∆ ↪→ ϕ2 → ψ (left
logical equivalence).
RW+. If `Λ∪∆fo ψ1 ⇒ ψ2, then from ∆ ↪→ ϕ → ψ1 infer ∆ ↪→ ϕ → ψ2 (right
weakening).
REF. ∆ ↪→ ϕ→ ϕ (reflexivity).
AND. From ∆ ↪→ ϕ→ ψ1 and ∆ ↪→ ϕ→ ψ2 infer ∆ ↪→ ϕ→ ψ1 ∧ ψ2.
OR. From ∆ ↪→ ϕ1 → ψ and ∆ ↪→ ϕ2 → ψ infer ∆ ↪→ ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 → ψ.
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CM. From ∆ ↪→ ϕ1 → ϕ2 and ∆ ↪→ ϕ1 → ψ infer ∆ ↪→ ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 → ψ (cautious
monotonicity).
It is interesting to contrast LLE+, RW+, and CM. While RW+ allows a formula
ψ1 on the right-hand side of→ to be replaced by a weaker formula ψ2 (that is, a
formula such that that ψ1 ⇒ ψ2 is provable), LLE+ just allows a formula ϕ1 on
the left-hand side of → to be replaced by an equivalent formula ϕ2, rather than
a stronger formula. CM allows the replacement of a formula ϕ1 on the left-hand
side by a stronger formula, ϕ1 ∧ϕ2, but only if ϕ1 → ϕ2 holds. Intuitively, this
says that if ϕ2 and ψ each almost always hold given ϕ1, then ψ almost always
holds given both ϕ1 and ϕ2. Monotonicity does not hold in general. That is,
if ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2 is provable and ϕ2 → ψ holds, then ϕ1 → ψ does not necessarily
hold. For a simple counterexample, it is not the case that if true → ψ holds
then ¬ψ → ψ holds. If ψ(x) states that x cannot forge a signature, we might
expect that almost always, x cannot forge the signature (true → ψ(x)), but it
surely is not the case that x cannot forge the signature given that x can forge
it. The other two axioms AND and OR are easy to explain. AND says that if
both ψ1 and ψ2 almost always hold given ϕ, then so does ψ1 ∧ ψ2, while OR
allows reasoning by cases: if ψ almost always holds given each of ϕ1 and ϕ2,
then it almost always holds given their disjunction.
The following additional axioms account for universal quantification, and the
fact that L0C includes first-order formulas. One of the axiom uses the notion of
interpretation-independent formula, which is a first-order formula that does not
mention any constant, function, or predicate symbols (and thus, is a formula
whose atomic predicates are all of the form x = y). In the axioms below, we
assume that Λ is a first-order theory.
Λ-AX+. If ϕ ∈ Lfo and `Λ∪∆fo ϕ, then from (∆ ∪ {ϕ}) ↪→ ψ infer ∆ ↪→ ψ.12
F1+. If z is a variable that does not appear in ϕ, then from (∆ ∪ ϕ[x/z]) ↪→ ψ
infer (∆ ∪ ∀xϕ) ↪→ ψ.
F3+. If x does not appear free in ∆, then from ∆ ↪→ ϕ infer ∆ ↪→ ∀xϕ.
EQ. If x does not appear free in ∆, ϕ, or ψ, and σ is a first-order formula, then
from (∆ ∪ {σ}) ↪→ ϕ infer (∆ ∪ {∃xσ}) ↪→ ϕ (existential quantification).
REN. If y1, . . . , yn do not appear in ϕ, then from ∆ ↪→ ∀x1 . . . ∀xnϕ infer ∆ ↪→
∀y1 . . . ∀yn(ϕ[x1/y1, . . . , xn/yn]) (renaming).
II. If σ1 and σ2 are interpretation-independent, then from (∆∪{σ1}) ↪→ ϕ and
(∆∪{σ2}) ↪→ ϕ, infer (∆∪{σ1∨σ2}) ↪→ ϕ (interpretation independence).
Let P+Λ be the axiom system consisting of LLE
+, RW+, REF, AND, OR,
CM, Λ-AX+, F1+, F3+, EQ, REN, and II. A derivation from P+Λ consists of a
sequence of steps, where each step has the form ∆ ↪→ ϕ and either (a) ϕ ∈ ∆
or (b) there is an inference rule “if condition C holds, then from ∆1 ↪→ ϕ1, . . . ,
12This rule has changed somewhat from the one in [1], to make it more convenient to apply.
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∆k ↪→ ϕk infer ∆ ↪→ ϕ”, condition C holds, and ∆1 ↪→ ϕ1, . . . ,∆k ↪→ ϕk appear
in earlier steps of the derivation. (The “condition C” might be a statement
such as “`Λ∪∆fo ϕ ⇔ ψ and ϕ ∈ Lfo”, which appears in LLE+.) We write
P+Λ ` ∆ ↪→ ϕ if there is a derivation from P+Λ whose last line in ∆ ↪→ ϕ.
Let PS(Λ) consist of all PS structures M such that world in M satisfies
Λ. We write PS(Λ) |= p ∆ ↪→ ϕ if (M,V ) |= p ∆ ↪→ ϕ for all PS structures
M ∈ PS(Λ) and valuations V .
Theorem 2. [1] If ∆ ∪ {∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ϕ → ψ)} ⊆ L0C , then PBΛ ` ∆ ↪→
∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ϕ→ ψ) if and only if PS(Λ) |= p ∆ ↪→ ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ϕ→ ψ).
We now specialize these axioms to LBC . We start with the analogues of
axioms from PΛ. Consider the following three axioms:
B1. If `Λ∪∆fo ϕ⇒ ϕ′, then from ∆ ↪→ Bϕ infer ∆ ↪→ Bϕ′.
B2. ∆ ↪→ B(true).
B3. From ∆ ↪→ Bϕ and ∆ ↪→ Bϕ′ infer ∆ ↪→ B(ϕ ∧ ϕ′).
It should be clear that B1 is just RW+ restricted to LBC ; B2 is REF restricted
to the only formula in LBC to which it applies, namely true → true; and B3 is
the restriction of AND to LBC . It is easy to see that there are no instances of
LLE+, OR, or CM in LBC . The version of B1–B3 in the main text can be viewed
as the special case where ∆ = ∅.
Let PBΛ be the result of replacing LLE
+, RW+, REF, AND, OR, and CM in
P+Λ by B1–B3. Given a collection ∆ of → formulas, we write PBΛ ` ∆ ↪→ ϕ if
ϕ → ψ can be derived from ∆ using these rules. A derivation from ∆ consists
of a sequence of steps of the form ∆ ↪→ ϕ, where either (a) ϕ ∈ ∆, (b) ϕ is
Bi(true) (so that this is just axiom B2), or (c) ∆ ↪→ ϕ follows from previous
steps by an application of B1 or B3.
Theorem 3. If ∆ ⊆ LBC ∪ Lfo and ∀x1 . . . ∀xnBϕ ∈ LBC , then PBΛ ` ∆ ↪→
∀x1 . . . ∀xnBϕ if and only if PS(Λ) |= p ∆ ↪→ ∀x1 . . . ∀xnBϕ.
Proof. The soundness follows from the soundness of P+Λ , proved in [1]. To
prove completeness, we first prove that B1-B3 are sound and complete for the
fragment LBC ∩ L−C . Again, soundness is immediate. Completeness is also quite
straightforward, as we now show.
We start by showing that PS(Λ) |= p {ψ1, . . . , ψk, Bϕ1, . . . , Bϕm} ↪→ Bσ
(where ψ1, . . . , ψk, ϕ1, . . . , ϕm, and σ are all in Lfo) iff Λ |= p (ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψk ∧
ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm) ⇒ σ. The “if” direction is obvious. For the “only if” direction,
suppose that Λ 6|= p (ψ1∧ . . .∧ψk ∧ϕ1∧ ...∧ϕm)⇒ σ. Then σ′ = ψ1∧ . . .∧ψk ∧
ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm ∧ ¬σ is satisfied in a relational structure R that also satisfies all
the formulas in Λ. Let M = (D, {w}, pi,P), where D is the domain in R, pi(w)
is the interpretation in R, and P = (Pr,Pr,Pr, . . .), and Pr assigns probability
1 to world w. Then M ∈ PS(Λ) and M |= p ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψk ∧ Bϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bϕm,
but M |= p ¬Bσ. Thus, M 6|= p {ψ1, . . . , ψk, Bϕ1, . . . , Bϕm} ↪→ Bσ.
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Now suppose that PS(Λ) |= p ∆ ↪→ Bϕ, where ∆ = {ψ1, . . . , ψk, Bϕ1, . . . , Bϕm}.
Since `Λ∪∆fo true ⇒ (ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψk), by B1 and B2, it follows that PBΛ ` ∆ ↪→
B(ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψk). Since Bϕ1, . . . , Bϕm ∈ ∆, applying B3 repeatedly, it follows
that PBΛ ` B(ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψk ∧ ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕm). By the arguments above and
the completeness of first-order logic, since PS(Λ) |= p ∆ ↪→ Bϕ, we must have
`Λ (ψ1 ∧ . . .∧ψk ∧ϕ1 ∧ . . .∧ϕm)⇒ σ. Thus, applying B1 again, it follows that
PBΛ ` ∆ ↪→ Bϕ.
Given the soundness and completeness of B1-B3 for the L−C ∩LB , the proof
that adding the remaining axioms gives soundness and completeness LB is now
identical to that going from L−C to LC given in Theorem 3.5 of [1]. We omit
further details here.
A.5 Quantitative reasoning
Up to now, we have just considered a qualitative semantics for conditional logic.
A formula of the form ϕ → ψ is true if, for all k, the conditional probability
of ψ given ϕ is at least 1 − 1/nk for all sufficiently large n. Here n can be, for
example, the security parameter. While this asymptotic complexity certainly
gives insight into the security of a protocol, in practice, a system designer wants
to achieve a certain level of security, and needs to know, for example, how
large to take the keys in order to achieve this level. In [1], a more quantitative
semantics appropriate for such reasoning was introduced and related to the more
qualitative “asymptotic” semantics. We briefly review the relevant details here,
and specialize them to the language of belief.
The syntax of the quantitative language considered in [1], denoted LC,q, is
just like that of L0C , except that instead of formulas of the form ϕ→ ψ there are
formulas of the form ϕ→r ψ, where r is a real number in [0, 1]. The semantics
of such a formula is straightforward:
(M,V ) |= ϕ→r ψ if there exists some n∗ ≥ 0 such that
for all n ≥ n∗, Prn([[ψ]]M,V | [[ϕ]]M,V ) ≥ 1− r).
In our quantitative logic, we do not have a sequence of probability distributions
on the left hand-side of |= p; rather, we have a single distribution (determined by
the function  and the parameters η tb, and ~η). Nevertheless, as we shall see, the
axioms that characterize quantitative conditional logic in the case of a sequence
of distributions are essentially the same as those for a single distribution.
Let L0C,q be the obvious analogue of L0C , consisting of all formulas of the
form ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ϕ→r ψ), where ϕ and ψ are first-order formulas. For each of
the axioms and rules in system PΛ, there is a corresponding sound axiom or
rule in L0C,q:
LLEq. If `Λ∪∆fo ϕ1 ⇔ ϕ2, then from ∆ ↪→ ϕ1 →r ψ infer ∆ ↪→ ϕ2 →r ψ.
RWq. If `Λ∪∆fo ψ1 ⇒ ψ2, then from ∆ ↪→ ϕ→r ψ1 infer ∆ ↪→ ϕ→r ψ2.
REFq. ∆ ↪→ ϕ→0 ϕ (reflexivity).
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ANDq. From ∆ ↪→ ϕ →r1 ψ1 and ∆ ↪→ ϕ →r2 ψ2 infer ∆ ↪→ ϕ →r3 ψ1 ∧ ψ2,
where r3 = min(r1 + r2, 1).
ORq. From ∆ ↪→ ϕ1 →r1 ψ and ∆ ↪→ ϕ1 →r2 ψ infer ∆ ↪→ ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 →r3 ψ,
where r3 = min(max(2r1, 2r2), 1).
CMq. From ∆ ↪→ ϕ1 →r1 ϕ2 and ∆ ↪→ ϕ1 →r2 ψ infer ∆ ↪→ ϕ ∧ ϕ2 →r3 ψ,
where r3 = min(r1 + r2, 1).
Let P+,qΛ consist of the rules above, together with F1
+, F3+, EQ, REN, and II
(all of which hold with no change in the quantitative setting), and
INC. If r1 ≤ r2, then from ∆ ↪→ ϕ→r1 ψ infer ∆ ↪→ ϕ→r2 ψ.
Theorem 4. [1] The rules in P+,qΛ are all sound.
There is a deep relationship between P+Λ and P
+,q
Λ . To make it precise, given
a set of formulas ∆ ⊆ L0C , say that ∆′ ⊆ L0C,q is a quantitative instantiation of
∆ if, for every formula ϕ → ψ ∈ ∆, there is a bijection f from ∆ to ∆′ such
that, for every formula ϕ → ψ ∈ ∆, there is a real number r ∈ [0, 1] such that
f(ϕ → ψ) = ϕ →r ψ. That is, ∆′ is a quantitative instantiation of ∆ if each
qualitative formula in ∆ has a quantitative analogue in ∆′.
The key result in [1] is the following, which shows the power of using of
P+Λ . Specifically, it shows that if ∆ ↪→ ϕ → ψ is derivable in P+Λ then, for all
r ∈ [0, 1], there exists a quantitative instantiation ∆′ of ∆ such that ϕ →r ψ
is derivable from ∆′ in P+,qΛ . Thus, if the system designer wants security at
level r (that is, she wants to know that the desired security property holds with
probability at least 1− r), then if she has a qualitative proof of the result, she
can compute the strength with which her assumptions must hold in order for
the desired conclusion to hold. For example, she can compute how to set the
security parameters in order to get the desired level of security. This result
can be viewed as justifying qualitative reasoning. Roughly speaking, it says
that it is safe to avoid thinking about the quantitative details, since they can
always be derived later. Note that this result would not hold if the language
allowed negation. For example, even if ¬(ϕ → ψ) could be proved given some
assumptions (using the axiom system AXΛC), it would not necessarily follow
that ¬(ϕ →q ψ) holds, even if the probability of the assumptions was taken
arbitrarily close to one.
Theorem 5. [1] If P+Λ ` ∆ ↪→ ϕ → ψ, then for all r ∈ [0, 1], there exists a
quantitative instantiation ∆′ of ∆ such that P+,qΛ ` ∆′ ↪→ ϕ →q ψ. Moreover,
∆′ can be found in polynomial time, given the derivation of ∆ ↪→ ϕ→ ψ.
Intuitively, Theorem 5 says that if there is a qualitative proof of ϕ → ψ
from the assumptions in ∆, given a desired confidence level 1 − r, we can, in
polynomial time, compute the probability with which the assumptions in ∆ need
to hold in order to ensure that the conclusion ϕ→ ψ holds with confidence 1−r.
Let LB,qC be the restriction of LC,q so that→r appears only in the context of
true →r ϕ, which we abbreviate as Brϕ. The quantitative analogue of B1–B3
is obvious:
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B1q If `Λ∪∆fo ϕ⇒ ϕ′, then from ∆ ↪→ Brϕ infer ∆ ↪→ Brϕ′.
B2q ∆ ↪→ B0(true).
B3q From ∆ ↪→ Br1ϕ and ∆ ↪→ Br2ϕ′ infer ∆ ↪→ Br3(ϕ ∧ ϕ′), where r3 =
min(r1 + r2, 1).
Let PB,qΛ consist of B1
q, B2q, B3q,F1+, F3+, EQ, REN, II, and INC. The
key reason that a sequence of probability distributions was used even for the
quantitative semantics in [1] is that it made it possible to establish an impor-
tant connection between the qualitative and quantitative semantics. The same
argument as that used in [1] for P+,qΛ can be used to show the following result:
Theorem 6. If PBΛ ` ∆ ↪→ Bψ, then for all r ∈ [0, 1], there exists a quantitative
instantiation ∆′ of ∆ such that PB,qΛ ` ∆′ ↪→ Bqψ. Moreover, ∆′ can be found
in polynomial time, given the derivation of ∆ ↪→ ϕ→ ψ.
Although we have stated all the axioms above in terms of constants r, r1,
r2, and r3, we can easily modify them so as to state them in terms of functions
(η, tb, ~n); we leave details to the reader.
This result is quite relevant for us. It says that if we an prove a statement
in qualitative conditional logic, then for all desired probability levels 1 − q, in
all models where the assumptions hold with sufficiently high probability, the
conclusion will hold with probability at least 1− q.
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